


MAKING CITIES SAFER: INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES

Number 1



uOttawa

Institute for the Prevention of Crime
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Executive Summary

Un sommaire exécutif suit en français

There are longstanding debates about the most effective ways for governments and communities to tackle problems of crime and community safety. Deterring and preventing crime were once seen primarily as the responsibility of police, courts and prisons. More recently, effective prevention strategies are seen to result from identifying and addressing the root causes of crime through multi-agency community partnerships at the local government level.

All levels of government have a role to play in preventing crime and improving community safety. Municipalities are especially important as they are the level of government best able to identify local crime problems as well as the conditions that contribute to these problems. Most have direct responsibility for delivering the services that can tackle these conditions, such as housing, social services, recreation, police, zoning and public health. They are also the location of schools.

This document provides an overview of municipally-based crime prevention strategies internationally and the successes and challenges of doing this work. The aim is to make information accessible that can guide

the development and implementation of effective crime prevention strategies in Canadian cities.

The Institute for the Prevention of Crime (IPC) at the University of Ottawa has developed a network of municipalities across Canada who are working together to improve their capacity to develop and sustain crime prevention and community safety initiatives. This network includes Vancouver, Surrey, Edmonton, Calgary, Saskatoon, Regina, Winnipeg, Waterloo Region, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Saint John and Halifax.

By fostering a network and organizing conferences and workshops to share knowledge and experience, this collaboration will identify gaps and needs for more effective prevention strategies. In-depth descriptions of activities and governance structures in each of these municipalities, along with success and challenges and recommendations for the future, will be available in the forthcoming IPC publication *Making Cities Safer: Canadian Strategies and Practices*.

Crime affects a significant number of Canadians each year. About 1 in 4 Canadians will be the victims

of at least one crime annually. Half a million women will be sexually assaulted, and similar numbers of households will experience break-ins and motor vehicle crimes (Gannon & Mihorean, 2005). This is in a range similar to other industrialized countries (Besserer, 2002).

Although police statistics show a drop in crime since the early 1990s, the violent crime rate is still more than four times higher than in 1962. Canada's homicide rate is about half that of the United States (2.0 vs. 5.6) but is higher than the rate in Australia and many Western European countries, such as France, England and Wales, Germany and Denmark (Dauvergne & Li, 2006). The property crime rate is twice as high as it was in 1962. Break-ins into homes and businesses have declined substantially and are now at levels lower than in 1977. Even so, Canada has had higher rates of break-ins than the United States since the early 1980s (Gannon, 2001). Theft of motor vehicles is now at levels higher than 1977, and is higher than the per capita rate in the United States.

Recognition of the role of local governments in crime prevention and community safety has grown rapidly at the international level. Beginning with international conferences of municipal associations, recommendations for municipally-based comprehensive strategies on crime prevention have been integrated into the policies and guidelines of United Nations agencies. In Canada, various parliamentary committees and national organizations have recognized the need for a coordinated multi-agency approach to addressing local crime problems and improving community safety. These include the Canadian Council on Social Development, the reports of two Standing Committees on Justice and the Solicitor General (the Horner Report and

the Cohen Report), the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, to name a few.

This document reviews the policies and experiences of selected countries in implementing comprehensive crime prevention initiatives and identifies key ingredients that are critical for success. The most comprehensive crime reduction strategy is in the United Kingdom where multi-sector partnerships at the municipal level are mandated through legislation. There is a strong focus on capacity building, widespread implementation of promising programs, and crime reduction targets. Independent assessments by the National Audit Office determined that these combined efforts contributed to a reduction in crime as recorded by the British Crime Survey. It may be the planning process and targets as much as the specific projects implemented that have led to the success.

Several governments in continental Europe have funded local government strategies that mobilize different sectors such as education, police, housing and so on around innovative strategies to prevent crime. Our analysis of the literature relating to Belgium, France, Sweden and the Netherlands was not able to identify evidence as to whether these actions had in fact lead to a reduction in crime. Some use data to focus their actions but do not have independent assessments or indicators of achievement. There is encouragement and support from the federal and state governments in Australia for the development of multi-agency partnerships and use of the evidence base to address crime and safety problems at the local level, but again no clear evidence of impact on outcomes such as a reduction in victimization.

There is good evidence from the United States that problem-oriented policing, when partnered with community members and social services targeted to risk factors, can effectively reduce crime and violence in communities, but only if directed by good problem analysis and evaluation of outcomes. A promising example of crime reduction based on tackling risk and protective factors at the local level is “Communities that Care” which combines inter-sectoral partnerships with analysis of risk factors and measures of outcome based on validated tools. The lack of permanent responsibility centres for crime prevention at the municipal level in the USA means that problems solved often recur and partnerships between key agencies are rarely sustained.

Internationally, the UN-Habitat as the agency responsible for housing and cities has developed guidelines that reinforce problem-solving processes. It has partnered with donor countries and used its access to technical expertise to assist several large cities in Africa to develop promising inter-sectoral strategies for reducing crime and preventing violence. The World Health Organization has adapted the lessons from the public health arena to stress that violence is preventable through data development and analysis, understanding the risk and protective factors of violence, tackling causes through prevention rather than waiting for law enforcement to react, promoting gender and social equality, strengthening services for victims, and developing a national action plan. A good example of the success of the public health approach is Bogotá, Colombia where public policy was informed by epidemiological analysis of health data so that rates of murder were reduced by fifty per cent. The WHO emphasizes the need to use permanent responsibility structures to maintain initiatives beyond initial successes.

This review highlights certain elements that are key to the success and sustainability of crime prevention and community safety initiatives. A fundamental requirement is the establishment of governance structures that will sustain crime reduction efforts during political and environment change. This means:

- Establishing a locus of responsibility with strong political leadership;
- Establishing multi-agency and multi-disciplinary partnerships in order to harness the combined expertise of different government departments, non-governmental organizations, the corporate sector and local citizens;
- Mobilizing local political and administrative authorities; and
- Emphasizing the need for greater integration of safety as a cross-cutting element of municipal planning.

Once an effective governance structure has been set up, certain activities are essential for successfully targeting the root causes behind local crime and safety problems and having a long-term impact:

- Establishing a problem-solving model;
- Developing an accurate understanding of the nature and dimensions of local problems through data analysis and research, including developing the capacity to do this;
- Incorporating the knowledge and engagement of frontline police, practitioners and academic researchers;
- Building on collaborative efforts and programs already established at the local level and fostering community involvement and a sense of local ownership;

- Implementing a range of programs based on knowledge of what has worked;
- Ensuring that these strategies do not have negative impacts elsewhere;
- Setting targets and monitoring performance through reliable data such as victimization surveys; and
- Having access to funding and technical resources to achieve short and long term impacts in a sustainable way.

The implementation and sustainability of comprehensive initiatives are not without certain challenges. For example, while working in partnership is key to success, very disadvantaged communities may have difficulty developing and sustaining partnerships, implementing programs and evaluating results. Participating agencies may focus on their own interests, and may be strongly committed to programs they are familiar with, whether or not they have been proven to be effective in reducing crime. Agencies for whom crime prevention is not perceived to be a central focus may be resistant to participating in projects aimed at preventing crime.

The experience of other countries demonstrates the importance of engaging communities in mobilization, conducting security diagnoses, developing local action plans, implementing short- and long-term interventions, and evaluating progress. This review includes examples where municipalities have successfully implemented comprehensive crime reduction strategies in a variety of settings to address a range of community safety problems. The principles are adaptable to Canadian municipalities if care is taken to understand the problems and strengths of local communities and to implement programs that target relevant risk factors for crime. The aim of this document and the one to follow is to make information accessible that can guide the development and implementation of effective crime prevention strategies in Canadian cities.

Sommaire

Les débats portant sur les moyens les plus efficaces pour les gouvernements et les collectivités deux problèmes de la criminalité et de la sécurité communautaire ne datent pas d'hier. Il fut un temps où on considérait que la responsabilité en matière de dissuasion et de prévention de la criminalité incombeait essentiellement à la police, aux tribunaux et au système carcéral. Plus récemment, on en est venu à penser que les stratégies efficaces de prévention de la criminalité découlaient de la détermination des causes profondes de la criminalité et des actions entreprises pour les contrer par le biais d'un partenariat communautaire de plusieurs organismes au niveau local de gouvernement.

Tous les ordres de gouvernement ont un rôle à jouer pour prévenir la criminalité et améliorer la sécurité communautaire. Les gouvernements municipaux sont particulièrement importants, puisqu'ils sont les mieux à même de déceler les problèmes de criminalité sur le plan local, de même que les conditions qui y contribuent. La plupart d'entre eux ont aussi la responsabilité immédiate d'offrir bon nombre des services permettant de s'attaquer à ces conditions, notamment l'habitation, les services sociaux, les loisirs, la police, le zonage et la santé publique. C'est aussi sur leur territoire que se trouvent les écoles.

Le présent document présente un aperçu des stratégies municipales de prévention de la criminalité sur la scène internationale ainsi que des réussites et des difficultés liées à ce travail. Le but est de rendre disponible de l'information qui pourra orienter l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre de stratégies efficaces de prévention de la criminalité dans les villes canadiennes.

L'Institut pour la prévention de la criminalité (IPC) à l'Université d'Ottawa a constitué un réseau de

municipalités de partout au Canada, qui collaborent en vue d'améliorer leur capacité d'élaborer et d'assurer la continuité d'initiatives de prévention de la criminalité et de sécurité communautaire. Font partie de ce réseau les villes de Vancouver, Surrey, Edmonton, Calgary, Saskatoon, Regina, Winnipeg, la Municipalité régionale de Waterloo, Toronto, Ottawa, Montréal, Québec, Saint John et Halifax.

Cette collaboration permettra de mettre en évidence les lacunes et les besoins de stratégies de prévention plus efficaces, en stimulant le réseau et en organisant des conférences et des ateliers visant la mise en commun des connaissances et de l'expérience. Une publication de l'IPC, *Making Cities Safer: Canadian Strategies and Practices*, paraîtra sous peu; on y présentera des descriptions détaillées des activités et des structures de gouvernance dans chacune de ces municipalités. On y fera aussi état des réussites et des défis à relever, de même que de recommandations pour l'avenir.

La criminalité a des répercussions sur un nombre important de Canadiens chaque année. On estime que 1 Canadien sur 4 sera victime d'un crime au cours d'une année. Un demi million de femmes seront agressées sexuellement; un nombre comparable de ménages seront victimes d'une introduction par effraction ou d'un crime lié à un véhicule d'automobile (Gannon et Mihorean, 2005). L'étendue de cette criminalité se compare à celle des autres pays industrialisés. (Besserer, 2002).

Bien que les statistiques policières révèlent une baisse de la criminalité depuis le début des années 1990, le taux des crimes avec violence demeure quatre fois plus élevé qu'il ne l'était en 1962. Le taux des homicides au Canada est d'environ la moitié de celui des

États-Unis, mais il est supérieur à celui de l'Australie et de nombreux pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest, tels la France, l'Angleterre, le Pays de Galles, l'Allemagne et le Danemark (Dauvergne et Li, 2006). Le taux des crimes contre les biens est deux fois plus élevé qu'il ne l'était en 1962. Le nombre des introductions par effraction dans des résidences et des places d'affaires a baissé considérablement et s'établit maintenant à des niveaux inférieurs à ceux de 1977. Même à cela, le taux des introductions par effraction au Canada est demeuré plus élevé que celui des États-Unis depuis le début des années 1980 (Gannon, 2001). Les vols de véhicules automobiles atteignent maintenant des niveaux plus élevés qu'en 1977 et des taux par habitant supérieurs à ceux des États-Unis.

La reconnaissance du rôle des gouvernements municipaux au chapitre de la prévention de la criminalité et de la sécurité communautaire a augmenté rapidement sur le plan international. À l'issue de conférences internationales d'associations municipales, certaines recommandations relatives à des stratégies municipales intégrées de prévention de la criminalité ont été incorporées dans les politiques et les lignes directrices de certains organismes des Nations Unies. Au Canada, divers comités parlementaires et organisations nationales ont reconnu le besoin d'une approche multiagences coordonnée destinée à contrer les problèmes locaux de criminalité et à améliorer la sécurité communautaire. On compte notamment parmi ces comités et organisations le Conseil canadien de développement social, le Comité permanent de la Justice et du Solliciteur général dans le cadre de deux de ses rapports (le rapport Horner et le rapport Cohen), l'Association canadienne des chefs de police, et la Fédération canadienne des municipalités.

Le présent document se penche sur les politiques et l'expérience de certains pays choisis dans la mise en œuvre d'initiatives globales de prévention de la criminalité et il recense les éléments clés essentiels à leur réussite. La stratégie de réduction de la criminalité la plus complète est celle du Royaume-Uni où des partenariats multisectoriels au niveau municipal sont mandatés en vertu de la loi. On met fortement l'accent sur le renforcement des capacités au niveau local, la mise en œuvre à grande échelle de programmes prometteurs et la détermination de cibles de réduction de la criminalité. Des évaluations indépendantes menées par le *National Audit Office* ont établi que ces efforts conjugués avaient contribué à une baisse de la criminalité, telle que constatée dans le cadre du *British Crime Survey*. Ces succès pourraient être attribuables tout autant au processus de planification et à la détermination de cibles qu'aux projets précis mis en place.

Plusieurs gouvernements des pays du continent européen ont contribué au financement de certaines stratégies de gouvernements locaux axées sur la mobilisation de divers secteurs, tels l'éducation, la police, l'habitation, et d'autres, articulées autour de stratégies novatrices de prévention de la criminalité. Notre analyse de la documentation relative à la Belgique, à la France, à la Suède et aux Pays-Bas ne nous a pas permis d'établir si ces actions avaient de fait entraîné une baisse de la criminalité. Certains se servent de données pour orienter leur action, mais n'ont pas recours à des résultats d'évaluations indépendantes ou à des indicateurs de rendement. Les gouvernements de l'Australie – le gouvernement fédéral et celui des États – encouragent et appuient le développement de partenariats multiagences et l'utilisation des fondements scientifiques pour aborder les problèmes de la criminalité et de la sécurité communautaire au

niveau local, mais, encore une fois, il n'existe aucune démonstration nette de leur incidence sur certains résultats, telle la réduction de la victimisation.

Certaines indications en provenance des États-Unis portent à croire que le processus du maintien de l'ordre axé sur la résolution des problèmes, s'il se conjugue aux efforts de membres de la collectivité et de services sociaux axés sur les facteurs de risque, peut contribuer de manière efficace à une baisse de la criminalité et de la violence au sein des collectivités, mais seulement s'il s'appuie sur une analyse efficace des problèmes et une évaluation des résultats. Il existe certains exemples prometteurs d'une baisse de la criminalité attribuable au fait de s'attaquer aux facteurs de risque et de protection au niveau local, notamment *Communities that Care*, une stratégie d'habilitation communautaire qui allie les partenariats intersectoriels et l'analyse des facteurs de risque et qui procède à la mesure des résultats à partir d'outils validés. Comme des centres de responsabilité permanents pour la prévention de la criminalité au niveau municipal font défaut aux États-Unis, il arrive souvent que certains problèmes qu'on avait résolus refassent surface et qu'on ne parvienne que rarement à entretenir les partenariats établis entre certains organismes clés.

Sur la scène internationale, UN-Habitat (Programme des Nations Unies pour les établissements humains), en qualité d'organisme responsable pour l'habitation et les villes, a élaboré des lignes directrices qui renforcent le processus de résolution de problème. L'organisme a conclu des partenariats avec des pays donateurs et mis à contribution son accès à une expertise technique pour aider plusieurs grandes villes d'Afrique à élaborer des stratégies intersectorielles prometteuses de réduction de la criminalité et de prévention de la violence.

L'Organisation mondiale de la santé a adapté les leçons qui se dégagent du milieu de la santé publique pour faire valoir qu'il est possible de prévenir la violence en procédant à l'élaboration et à l'analyse de données, en comprenant les facteurs de risque et de protection liés à la violence, en s'attaquant aux causes par le biais de la prévention plutôt que d'attendre l'intervention des autorités policières, en faisant la promotion de l'égalité des sexes et des races, en renforçant les programmes à l'intention des victimes, et en élaborant un plan d'action national. L'expérience de Bogota (Colombie) nous offre un bel exemple de l'efficacité de l'approche axée sur la santé publique : on a mis à contribution l'analyse épidémiologique des données relatives à la santé pour éclairer les politiques publiques, ce qui a permis de réduire de cinquante pour cent les taux d'homicide. L'OMS insiste sur la nécessité d'avoir recours à des structures de responsabilité permanentes pour faire en sorte que les initiatives se poursuivent au-delà de leurs succès initiaux.

Le présent examen met l'accent sur les éléments clés qui doivent être présents pour assurer le succès et la durabilité des approches de prévention de la criminalité et pour contribuer à l'amélioration de la sécurité communautaire. Une des exigences fondamentales est la mise en place de structures de gouvernance qui permettront de soutenir les efforts de réduction de la criminalité au cours des périodes de changement sur les plans politique et environnemental. Cela veut dire

- mettre en place un centre de responsabilité jouissant d'un leadership politique dynamique;
- créer des partenariats multiagences et multi-disciplinaires dans le but de mettre à contribution l'expertise combinée de divers ministères, d'organisations non gouvernementales, du secteur des entreprises et des citoyens du milieu;

- mobiliser les autorités politiques et administratives locales;
- mettre l'accent sur le besoin d'une plus grande intégration de la notion de sécurité en tant que thème transsectoriel de la planification municipale.

Après avoir mis sur pied une structure de gouvernance efficace, il faut entreprendre certaines activités essentielles pour cibler efficacement les causes profondes sous-jacentes aux problèmes locaux de criminalité et de sécurité et ayant une incidence à long terme :

- adopter une approche de résolution de problème;
- acquérir une connaissance précise de la nature et de l'importance des problèmes locaux en procédant à l'analyse de données et à de la recherche, incluant se doter de la capacité de le faire;
- mettre à contribution les connaissances et l'implication des policiers de première ligne, des praticiens et des chercheurs universitaires;
- tirer parti des efforts de collaboration et des programmes déjà établis au niveau local et favoriser l'implication de collectivités ainsi qu'un sentiment d'appartenance au niveau local;
- mettre en place une gamme de programmes fondés sur une connaissance de ce qui a déjà donné de bons résultats;
- veiller à ce que ces stratégies n'aient pas de conséquences négatives à d'autres niveaux;
- fixer des objectifs et suivre de près le rendement en s'appuyant sur des données fiables, telles les enquêtes sociales sur la victimisation;
- voir à obtenir le financement et les ressources techniques nécessaires pour que les effets à court et à long terme se fassent sentir de manière durable.

Mettre en œuvre des initiatives d'envergure et en assurer la durabilité présentent plusieurs défis. Par exemple, bien que le fait de travailler en partenariat soit un gage de succès, il pourrait s'avérer difficile pour certaines collectivités très défavorisées d'établir des partenariats et d'en assurer la continuité, de mettre des programmes en place et d'en évaluer les résultats. Certains organismes participants pourraient privilégier leurs propres intérêts et être profondément attachés à des programmes qui leur sont familiers, que ces programmes aient ou non démontré leur efficacité en matière de réduction de la criminalité. Il pourrait arriver que certains organismes soient réticents à participer à certains projets de prévention de la criminalité, si cette notion n'est pas au cœur de leurs préoccupations.

L'expérience d'autres pays illustre l'importance de mobiliser les collectivités, de procéder à des diagnostics locaux de sécurité, d'élaborer des plans d'action locaux, de mettre en œuvre des interventions à court et à long terme, et d'évaluer l'état d'avancement des choses. Cet examen présente certains exemples de municipalités qui ont réussi à mettre en œuvre des stratégies globales de réduction de la criminalité dans divers milieux en vue de s'attaquer à toute une gamme de problèmes liés à la sécurité communautaire. Les principes pourraient être adaptés aux municipalités canadiennes, pourvu qu'on prenne soin d'acquérir une bonne compréhension des problèmes et des forces des collectivités locales et de mettre en œuvre des programmes qui ciblent des facteurs de risque pertinents sous-jacents à la criminalité.

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I. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY

There are longstanding debates about the most effective ways for governments and communities to tackle problems of crime and community safety. Deterring and preventing crime was once seen primarily as the responsibility of police, courts and prisons. More recently, effective prevention strategies are seen to focus on identifying and addressing the root causes of crime using multi-agency community partnerships. This re-orientation is based on sound scientific evidence that intervening early in the lives of high-risk families and children, improving conditions in disadvantaged areas, and focusing on the conditions that breed crime are most effective for reducing crime (Farrington & Welsh, 2007).

Municipal governments have an important role to play in preventing crime and improving community safety. They are the level of government best able to identify local crime problems as well as the conditions that contribute to these problems. Municipalities are the level of government closest to citizens and most have direct responsibility for delivering the services that can tackle the factors leading to crime, such as housing, social services, recreation, police, by-laws, zoning and public health. They are an appropriate site for the development of comprehensive community safety planning in partnership with police, schools, community agencies and neighbourhood committees to identify and tackle the situations that put youth, families and neighbourhoods at risk of crime and victimization.

At the international level, recognition of the important role for local governments in crime prevention and community safety has grown rapidly. Beginning with international conferences of municipal associations, recommendations for municipally-based comprehensive strategies on crime prevention gradually have been integrated into the policies and guidelines of United Nations agencies. Major steps have been:

- 1982: National Mayors Commission on Security, France (the Bonnemaision Report) was influential throughout Europe and North American in promoting the need for municipalities to take the lead in developing multi-agency crime prevention structures
- 1989: Agenda for Safer Cities – Final Declaration of the European and North American Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention (Montreal Declaration) adopted a declaration on the importance of local leadership and action
- 1990: UN Crime Prevention Congress integrated the main elements of the Montreal declaration
- 1991: European Forum for Urban Safety, Federation of Canadian Municipalities, the United States Conference of Mayors: Final Declaration – Second International Conference on Urban Safety, Drugs and Crime Prevention (Paris Declaration)

1995: United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted Guidelines for the Prevention of Urban Crime

1996: UN-Habitat II Conference in Istanbul identified safety as a key element of sustainable urban development. The Safer Cities program in UN-Habitat was established the following year.

1998: Johannesburg Conference confirmed the relevance of this approach for the African continent

2002: World Health Organization Report on Violence and Health

2002: UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Crime adopted

The 2002 UN Guidelines list the following as important principles for action around crime prevention.

- All levels of government should play a leadership role in developing effective and humane crime prevention strategies.
- Crime prevention should be integrated into social and economic policies and programs, including employment, education, health, housing and urban planning, poverty, social marginalization and exclusion.
- Partnerships should be an integral part of effective crime prevention, including partnerships with authorities, community organizations, non-governmental organizations, the business sector and private citizens.
- Crime prevention should be based on a broad, multi-disciplinary foundation of knowledge about crime problems, their multiple causes and promising and proven practices.

- Crime prevention strategies should pay due regard to the different needs of men and women and consider the special needs of vulnerable members of society.


In recent years, local governments and elected officials in many countries have taken on a major role in community safety planning. The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) summarizes the basic elements of an effective approach to community safety at the local government level (Shaw, 2001), shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.

1. Identification and *mobilization* of key partners led by local city authorities and involving local agencies, community organizations, police and justice systems, and the private sector.
2. A rigorous assessment or *security diagnosis* of local problems of urban safety and victimization to set out policies and priorities based on partnership consensus.
3. Development of *local action plans* which address the causes of crime and victimization, not just its symptoms.
4. Implementation and evaluation of *long- and short-term prevention projects* which target social exclusion and urban poverty, specific crimes and specific geographical areas.
5. A central coordinating committee consisting of partnerships of government and community agencies whose work is guided by knowledge about risk factors and strong leadership.

The ICPC emphasizes that this is a long-term process, and requires education that prevention is a normal part of local community activity and local governance.

Figure 1

Effective implementation of crime prevention initiatives



Adapted from Shaw, 2001


This framework is well-established in the field of public health where primary prevention is a priority. The prevalence of a health problem is assessed, risk factors are identified, strategic action is taken to target risk factors, and outcomes are evaluated for their effectiveness (Butchart, Phinney, Check, & Vallaveces, 2004; Krug, Dalhberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002). Success in public health is measured by the number of healthy outcomes—the number of non-smokers, for example, not the number of cancer treatments—and health is promoted by multiplying successful approaches in the general population and targeting those at risk. This multi-sectoral problem-solving approach has been successfully adapted to the field of crime and violence prevention.

Relevance for Canada

The latest victimization survey estimates that about 1 in 4 Canadians will be the victims of at least one crime each year. Half a million women will be sexually assaulted, and similar numbers of households will experience a break-in and a motor vehicle crime (Gannon & Mihorean, 2005). This is in a range similar to other industrialized countries (Besserer, 2002).

It is not possible to use victimization surveys to compare rates of crime over long periods of time because the surveys are not undertaken annually. Crime recorded by the police provides an approximate indicator though care is needed in interpreting these

Figure 2
Police-recorded rates of violent crime in Canada



Source: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Statistics Canada


Violence crime includes homicide, assault, sexual offences, robbery, criminal harassment, abduction and other violent offences.

data as only about one-third of all victimizations are reported to the police. The level of violent crime recorded by the police in Canada increased rather steadily between 1962 and the early 1990s. It then declined slightly and has remained fairly constant since 1998 (see Figure 2). The violent crime rate in 2005 was more than four times higher than in 1962. Assaults make up three-quarters of all violent crimes and 80% of these are common assaults (Gannon, 2006). Canada's homicide rate is about half that of the United States (2.0 vs. 5.6) but is higher than the rate in Australia and many Western European

countries, such as France, England and Wales, Germany and Denmark (Dauvergne & Li, 2006).

The property crime rate dropped more dramatically in the 1990s; however, rates are still twice as high as they were in 1962 (see Figure 3). Break-ins into homes and businesses have declined substantially and are now at levels lower than in 1977. Even so, Canada has had higher rates of break-ins than the United States since the early 1980s (Gannon, 2001). Theft of motor vehicles is now at levels higher than 1977, and is higher than the per capita rate in the United States.

Figure 3
Police-recorded rates of property crime in Canada



Source: Uniform Crime Reporting Survey, Statistics Canada

Property crime includes break and enter, motor vehicle theft, fraud, other theft and other property offences.

Various parliamentary committees and national organizations in Canada have promoted the need for a coordinated multi-agency approach to preventing crime and improving community safety. In 1984, the Canadian Council on Social Development recommended a social development approach to crime prevention that supports disadvantaged families, schools and communities. In 1993, the report of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, *Crime Prevention in Canada: Toward a National Strategy* (also known as the Horner Report), highlighted the need to tackle

crime and victimization through strong national leadership and inter-governmental collaboration, and called for the federal government to spend 5% of the federal criminal justice budget on crime prevention. The Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police recommends the need for a balanced approach to crime and victimization that involves law enforcement and social development to address the conditions that contribute to crime.

The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) first developed a policy on community safety and

crime prevention following the European and North American Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention in Montreal in 1989. This policy has been regularly updated while at the same time retaining the basic principles with respect to municipalities. The 2006 FCM policy states that a strong, responsible municipal government is key to building a safe and healthy community. It further states that community-based, holistic approaches to combating crime and victimization are most successful when developed and implemented through intergovernmental and community-based partnerships. To address problems of crime and community safety, a social development focus that addresses the root causes of crime is needed.

Practical tools have been made available by at least two Canadian organizations to assist municipalities to plan and implement crime prevention strategies based on the basic principles of leadership, partnerships, safety diagnosis, action plan, implementation and evaluation. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, in the *Primer on Municipal Crime Prevention*, provides guidance on how to organize a local council, identify local problems, develop an action plan, plan crime prevention programs, and implement, monitor, and evaluate interventions (Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2000). *The Key to Safer Municipalities* is a toolkit developed by the Fondation Docteur Philippe-Pinel with the technical assistance of the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC). It is comprised of detailed fact sheets that provide communities with the information required to identify their unique risk factors and safety problems, secure political commitment, develop partnerships, engage citizens, and develop a plan of action.

At the federal government level, the National Strategy on Community Safety and Crime Prevention was established in 1994 with a mandate to encourage cooperation among federal, provincial and territorial governments and mobilize citizens to prevent crime and improve community safety. The main vehicle to implement this strategy was the National Crime Prevention Council. These were succeeded by the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) in 1998 which places a strong emphasis on crime prevention through social development through collaborative partnerships, community mobilization, and knowledge development and dissemination (Léonard, Rosario, Scott, & Bressan, 2005).

The NCPS provides a policy framework for the implementation of crime prevention interventions in Canada. It is jointly managed with the provinces and territories and administered by the National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) at Public Safety Canada. The Minister of Public Safety announced a new Blueprint for Effective Crime Prevention in 2007 which emphasizes evidence-based interventions—using what works—to address risk factors for crime. The Blueprint states that crime prevention interventions should be integrated with the activities of other programs and services, built on knowledge of risk and protective factors and use evidence-based practices, focused on specific priorities (vulnerable families, children and youth; youth gangs; recidivism among high-risk groups; and prevention in Aboriginal communities), and should produce measurable results. The NCPC emphasizes that multiple preventive interventions are needed to address the different social and situational factors that precipitate crime.

Some provincial governments have coordinated multi-departmental strategies as well. The Ministère de la sécurité publique du Québec (Ministry of Public Safety) in 2001 developed the policy *Making our Communities Safe for Everyone*. The policy advocates local strategies run by municipalities based on partnerships while the provincial government takes the role of planner and leader. Also in Québec, *l'Institut national de santé publique du Québec* (Public Health Institute) promotes action on community safety at the local level. It encourages actors to conduct local safety diagnoses, establish priorities, and tackle determinants of health and well-being that may also be linked to violence. The institute has published a guide to support those working to increase community safety in their municipalities. This guide consists of tools to help conduct a local safety diagnosis, collect data and better understand local community safety issues in order to develop and implement appropriate interventions.¹ Other provinces, including British Columbia, Alberta and Nova Scotia, were in the planning stages of comprehensive provincial crime prevention strategies at the time of writing.

These policy statements and recommendations—from non-governmental organizations, national associations and governments—all point to the importance of a multi-sectoral comprehensive approach to reducing crime and improving community safety. One recent initiative to support the efforts of municipalities in developing comprehensive and coordinated crime prevention

strategies is the Municipal Network on Crime Prevention coordinated by the Institute for the Prevention of Crime (IPC) at the University of Ottawa. This network includes Vancouver, Surrey, Edmonton, Calgary, Saskatoon, Regina, Winnipeg, Waterloo Region, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Saint John and Halifax.

By fostering a network of municipalities committed to crime prevention, and organizing conferences and workshops to share knowledge, this collaboration will identify gaps and needs for more effective prevention strategies in Canada. In-depth descriptions of activities and governance structures in each of these municipalities, along with strengths and weaknesses and recommendations for the future, will be available in the forthcoming IPC publication *Making Cities Safer: Canadian Strategies and Practices*. Prevention of violence against women tends to be tackled separately from general crime prevention initiatives and will be addressed by the IPC in separate documents.

The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of municipally-based crime prevention policies and strategies internationally. Literature has been reviewed and site visits undertaken to bring together descriptive information about implementation strategies, successes and challenges. The aim of this document and the one to follow is to make information accessible that can guide the development and implementation of effective crime prevention strategies in Canadian cities.

1 www.inspq.qc.ca



II. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

In 1997, Prime Minister Blair's Labour government came to power with the promise to get "tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime". In 1999, the government of the United Kingdom embarked on "the most ambitious and innovative programme for tackling crime... so far attempted in the western developed world" (Homel, Nutley, Webb, & Tilley, 2004, p. 1). A two-pronged approach was developed: (1) tough-on-crime policies, including lowering the age of criminal responsibility, expanding the use of incarceration, and implementing new legislation to deal with anti-social behaviour; and, (2) a multi-faceted approach to reducing crime through addressing the root causes. Central components of the latter include the Crime Reduction Programme, Community Safety Partnerships, Crime and Disorder Partnership Reform, audit and inspection, the Youth Justice Board, and anti-social behaviour orders.

Crime Reduction Programme

The Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) is an example of the Labour government's holistic approach to tackling crime, disorder and drug misuse. The CRP was unique in many ways. It incorporated a high level of national government funding, a wide range of interventions delivered by many different agencies, a high degree of importance to evaluation, and aimed at improving and mainstreaming the knowledge base for crime reduction practice (Homel

et al., 2004, p. 1; Maguire, 2004, p. 215). There was an emphasis on building up scientific knowledge about what works to prevent crime that would help inform decisions about interventions that could be implemented on a large scale (Maguire, 2004). The CRP was initiated in 1999 as a £250 million program of work to be undertaken over three years. An additional £150 million was allocated for expansion of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). The CRP was replaced in 2002 with the Safer Communities Initiative under which funds were distributed to local partnerships.

The CRP is made up of 20 diverse initiatives including, but not limited to (Homel et al., 2004, p. 8):

- Burglary reduction;
- Focusing on children at families at risk;
- Interventions in schools to reduce truancy and expulsion;
- Youth exclusion aimed at high-risk youth in 70 deprived neighbourhoods;
- Treatment of offenders;
- Drug arrest referrals;
- Violence against women (domestic violence and sexual assault by known perpetrators);
- Developing the evidence base on sentencing;
- Neighbourhood wardens to promote community safety and tackle social disorder;
- CCTV;

- Tackling prostitution; and
- Targeted policing.

The CPR was part of a broader set of social programs implemented by the Labour government, including the Neighbourhood Renewal Programme, New Deal for Communities, and Sure Start (an early childhood parenting program) which were directed at alleviating some of the risk factors for crime. The CRP was expected to link with these initiatives and others on social exclusion, school performance and drug-related crime, reflecting the government's expectation of a horizontal approach to service delivery (Homel et al., 2004, p. 2).

The Home Office promotes the use of promising practices in crime prevention through a crime reduction website.² A Crime Reduction Centre, which was designed to provide a source of information and advice for practitioners and to respond to their learning and information needs, closed in 2004. The Home Office has underway a pilot project—Improving Performance Through Applied Knowledge—that aims to improve performance in policing, Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) and Drug Action Teams by helping practitioners apply knowledge about what works and the specific mechanisms that lead to success.³

Community Safety Partnerships

A cornerstone of current crime reduction strategies in the UK is the 1998 *Crime and Disorder Act*. Under this legislation, each local authority, together

with its police force, is required to establish multi-agency Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs), formerly known as Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs). These partnerships are made up of police, fire departments, probation and social services, as well as the private sector and voluntary organizations including organizations for young people. Similar partnerships were in existence in many municipalities prior to the legislation; the *Crime and Disorder Act* had the effect of ensuring that integrated municipal crime prevention structures exist universally across the UK. While there was no funding provided to local governments to develop these partnerships, funding for crime reduction projects was available through the Crime Reduction Programme and other sources.

Over a three-year period, Community Safety Partnerships were to develop strategies for the reduction of crime and disorder. Strategies are based on the four-step process shown in Figure 1: safety diagnosis, action plan, implementation and evaluation. The process is undertaken in consultation with the local community. Strategies were to include clear objectives, and performance targets (long-term and short-term) against which to measure the achievement of objectives. Each funded program was to include an evaluation component to ensure that short- and long-term benefits could be assessed. Six month rolling reviews have replaced the requirement for three-year reviews.

In 2004, Birmingham's use of the problem-solving approach won that city the European Crime Prevention Award. The Community Safety Partnership collaborated with Crime Concern,

² www.crimereduction.gov.uk

³ <http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/ipak/ipak01.htm>

a British consultancy and advisory group, to successfully reduce crime in eight high-crime and deprived neighbourhoods by systematically undertaking analyses of the crime problem in these areas, then acting to address the root causes. The program reduced youth crime by 17%, two and one-half times more than comparable areas. It is estimated that the investment of \$1.4 million achieved savings of \$140 million.

Crime and Disorder Partnership Reform

After nearly ten years of experience, the government of the UK is in the process of reforming the CDRP programme. This involves new legislation, a new statutory instrument, and the implementation of new national standards. These changes are implemented through the 2006 *Police and Justice Act* which makes amendments to the partnership provisions of the *Crime and Disorder Act*. The key changes will:

- Require partnerships to produce an annual three year rolling plan/strategy;
- Place a duty on named agencies to share aggregate, depersonalized data; and
- Define national standards for partnership working which include:
 - Empowerment and effective leadership to ensure that there is the right level of representation and involvement across CDRPs;
 - Intelligence led business processes to ensure that decision making is based on up-to-date information;
 - Effective and responsive delivery structures to enable partnerships to respond quickly and effectively to the safety needs of their communities;

- Community engagement to ensure that local people are informed, consulted and involved;
- Visible and constructive accountability to make CDRPs and their decisions accountable to local people; and
- Consideration of the knowledge and skills required to meet objectives identified in the plan.

The Act also creates a mechanism to give communities a means to request action on community safety issues.

Setting targets

As part of a broader move toward government accountability, national crime reduction targets, or Public Service Agreement (PSAs), were set by the central government in 1998. They were to reduce motor vehicle crime by 30% by 2004, domestic burglary by 25% and robbery in major cities by 14% by 2005 (Homel et al., 2004).

Revised PSAs were set in 2004, to be achieved by 2008 (see Table 1). Each has an accompanying technical note that sets out how each target is to be measured. According to the 2006 Home Office Targets Performance Report, success toward reaching these PSAs has been achieved. For example, crime has been reduced by 15% and further in high-crime areas, fear of crime and anti-social behaviour has been reduced, and confidence in the criminal justice system has been improved. The primary source for assessing performance is the British Crime Survey (BCS), an annual crime victimization survey. Victimization surveys are a more reliable indicator of the level of crime because it measures people's direct experiences of crime and is not affected by changes in reporting to, or recording by, the police.

Table 1:
Public Service Agreements for 2004-2008

PSA	Progress
1. Reduce crime by 15% and further in high-crime areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12% reduction in crime according to the British Crime Survey • Average 13% reduction in high-crime areas; 7% in other areas
2. Reassure the public, reduce the fear of crime and anti-social behaviour, and build confidence in the criminal justice system without compromising fairness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Worry about violent crime, vehicle crime, burglary and anti-social behaviour has been reduced • Confidence in the criminal justice system is up

Source: Home Office Targets Autumn Performance Report, 2006.

The survey results are based on interviews with approximately 40,000 adults each year.

Targets are useful management tools in many respects. They help identify desired processes or outcomes, help ensure money is well spent, provide organizational focus, provide a clear statement of what an organization is trying to achieve, offer a basis for monitoring what is and is not working, and provide better public accountability (Social Market Foundation, 2005). They can also help align different agencies which otherwise might be reluctant to cooperate.

The 2004 PSAs have been criticized for not being numerically specific and being more like aspirations than targets or measurements of performance (Social Market Foundation, 2005). For example, there are no quantifiable targets set for a reduction in fear of crime and no fixed percentage improvement. Without quantifiable goals, it is difficult to assess progress. For example, it is not clear what is to be measured by “building confidence in the criminal justice system without compromising fairness” (Social Market Foundation, 2005, p. 72). Problems also arise when there is tension between national crime reduction targets and priorities set at the local level (Audit Commission, 2006b). New national targets will

be released from the Home Office in 2007 which will be comprised of two tiers: (1) a small number of targets around which there is broad agreement, such as serious violence and high volume crime; and (2) a broad list from which communities can choose, based on local priorities.

Audit and inspection

Many aspects of the implementation and functioning of the Crime Reduction Programme and Community Safety Partnerships have been evaluated by UK government bodies, such as the National Audit Office (NAO) at the national level and the Audit Commission at the level of local governments. These audits include a major focus on outcomes, the primary one being reductions in victimization.

The NAO examined the role of the Home Office in overseeing initiatives funded from its crime reduction grants and concluded that, although it is difficult to establish a direct cause and effect, these efforts have contributed to a reduction in crime as recorded by the British Crime Survey (National Audit Office, 2004). The NAO characterizes many of the projects funded by the Home Office as diverse, innovative and successful in reducing

crime. However, they identified problems associated with delays and difficulties in sustaining projects, difficulties recruiting and retaining skilled staff, and administrative burdens on the Partnerships which hampered efforts.⁴ They conclude that successful projects are those that:

- Create a synergy among partners;
- Target underlying causes of crime through a strong analysis of local data; and
- Draw upon lessons learned.

The NAO made a number of recommendations to strengthen this work, including:

- Learning and building on past experience;
- Greater sharing of good practices;
- Assessing proposed projects against good practice and lessons learned;
- Ensuring the use of skilled project managers;
- Coordinating the involvement of each partner to maximize effectiveness;
- Expanding project evaluations;
- Improving feedback to partnerships; and
- Simplifying funding arrangements.

The Audit Commission is an independent body that evaluates the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of local government services in the UK. Outcomes to be achieved by local councils include the reduction and prevention of crime, anti-social behaviour and fear of crime, and the reduction and prevention of substance misuse (Audit Commission, 2006a, p. 2).

The Audit Commission inspection focuses on how councils achieve these outcomes in partnership with other organizations. In a review of the work of Community Safety Partnerships, the Audit Commission made several recommendations for developing and sustaining effective crime prevention partnerships that have broad applicability for any municipality (Audit Commission, 2002; 2005):

- Partnerships need to be clear about what they are trying to accomplish and how;
- Adequate time and other resources must be made available for each agency to participate fully;
- Comprehensive agreements are needed for good governance and management, and a clear and shared focus;
- There should be clear targets for monitoring progress;
- Partners should have the delegated authority to make decisions on behalf of their agencies;
- Roles and responsibilities must be clear;
- There should be strong central leadership, clear shared vision, agreed outcomes as well as trust and goodwill between partner organizations; and
- Sustainability should be built in at the outset.

In order to address the concerns of different neighbourhoods, the Audit Commission recommends that local partners use reliable up-to-date information about local problems, combined with the knowledge of frontline workers. To assist local partnerships form a more comprehensive view of community safety delivery, the Audit Commission has established a library of community safety performance indicators which comprise a mix

⁴ The UK government has introduced a number of initiatives to improve the governance of partnerships locally, including local area agreements (LAAs) that are designed to improve horizontal accountability, align budgets and other processes and streamline decisions on service planning and delivery.

of national and locally used indicators.⁵ Local community partnerships are encouraged to assess the appropriateness of each indicator for their own purposes before adopting them.

The Audit Commission has also assembled neighbourhood profiles on their website that provide quality of life indicators, such as employment and economic well-being, housing, the environment, transportation, perceptions of community safety, and crime levels.⁶ The Jill Dando Institute has developed a Vulnerable Localities Index to assist police in identifying neighbourhoods that require attention. Training is available to assist analysts and practitioners to put this resource to use in their local areas. Included in the Index are indicators of deprivation, anti-social behaviour, disorder, socio-economic conditions, demographic characteristics and crime data.⁷

Other commentators point to the complexity and ambitious nature of the Crime Reduction Programme as posing unique challenges. The CRP demanded rapid identification, mobilization and coordination of large numbers of people and organizations with a broad array of skills that were sometimes difficult to secure (Maguire, 2004). Practitioners were expected to quickly adapt to working in new ways within the context of new forms of partnerships. There were tensions between longer-term goals of building knowledge about what works to prevent crime and the need to show early results (Homel et al., 2004; Maguire, 2004; Nutley & Homel, 2006). Practical implementation problems were perhaps inevitable in such a large

and comprehensive initiative involving ambitious time scales coupled with slow bureaucratic procedures. Many lessons were learned since the genesis of CRPs in the UK, perhaps most importantly that it takes time to establish effective crime reduction partnerships within the constellation of existing services.

The Crime Reduction Programme has successfully achieved its major goal of reducing many types of crime in the UK. However, at the national level, some targets have not been met and some negative outcomes have occurred as well (Solomon, Eades, Garside, Rutherford, 2007). For example, robbery reduction targets in particular areas have not been met and the number of homicides has risen since 1997. Spending on policing and imprisonment increased by 75% between 1997 and 2007. The challenge for governments is to reduce crime humanely and fairly while not over-burdening citizens with rising criminal justice expenditures or overly-punitive responses to crime.

Youth Justice Board

The Youth Justice Board (YJB) was created by the *Crime and Disorder Act* in 1998 to oversee the youth justice system in England and Wales. It was created in response to recommendations made by the Audit Commission in a 1996 report *Misspent Youth*. This report criticized the response to youth crime and called for much more investment in prevention (Morgan Harris Burrows, 2003). It argued for such preventive activity to be carefully targeted—both in areas where crime by young people constitutes

5 Available on the website of the Audit Commission at http://www.local-pi-library.gov.uk/LIBRARY_ALL_PIS.ASP?MENUID=502.

6 ([http://www.areaprofiles.audit-commission.gov.uk/\(rh213idc3g4fo45iqgfr045\)/StaticPage.aspx?info=25&menu=56](http://www.areaprofiles.audit-commission.gov.uk/(rh213idc3g4fo45iqgfr045)/StaticPage.aspx?info=25&menu=56))

7 http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/crime_mapping/vulnerable_localities/index.php

a major problem, and at those young people who are at-risk. This could only happen if there were major improvements in the way different agencies worked together.

The YJB has a significant role in preventing offending and reoffending by young people. Its mandate is to influence policy, identify effective practice, and commission research on risk factors and how to tackle them. The YJB has developed and funded a range of early intervention and diversionary programs that tackle risk factors for crime and anti-social behaviour in the family, community and school environments and has multiplied them across the country. Major programs include Youth Inclusion and Support Panels and the Youth Inclusion Programme.

- Youth Inclusion and Support Panels (YISP) are multi-agency planning groups that help to prevent offending and anti-social behaviour by offering voluntary support services to high-risk 8 to 13 year olds and their families. They help identify young people at highest risk of offending, assess their needs, and establish an action plan to assist the young person and their family.
- The Youth Inclusion Programme (YIP) is a multi-agency social inclusion project which intervenes early with the 50 highest at-risk young people in 110 communities across England and Wales. YIPs are located in high-crime, high-deprivation neighbourhoods and are also open to other young people in the area. Originally targeted at youth aged 13 to 16, Junior YIPs have been extended to children aged 8 to 12.

The Youth Justice Board established the Youth Inclusion Programme in 2000 as part of a strategy to deal with young people at highest risk of

criminal offending. Eligible young people are identified through a number of different agencies including Youth Offending Teams (comprised of police, social services, probation service, health, and local education authorities) and other local agencies. The program provides opportunities for young people to learn new skills, take part in pro-social activities and get help with education and employment. The workers and volunteer mentors provide positive role models who help to change young people's attitudes toward education and crime. Each YIP receives an annual grant from the YJB through its Youth Offending Team and is required to find additional funding from local agencies. The goal is to reduce youth offending by 30% in at least two-thirds of neighbourhoods with a YIP. An independent national evaluation of the first three years of operation found that across the 70 YIPs operating at that time:

- Nearly three-quarters of the top 50 youth had attended a YIP at some time;
- Less than 10% of all young people attending the program, including the top 50, had attended for 10 hours per week;
- There was a 65% reduction in arrests for the top 50 young people who were actively engaged in the program since its inception;
- Of those who had been arrested before joining the program, 75% were arrested for fewer offences after engaging with a YIP and the seriousness of offences had decreased;
- Of those who had not been arrested previously but who were at risk, 73% did not go on to be arrested after engaging with a YIP; and
- There was a decrease in crime in the local area of 4% in the first year and 8% in the second year of all YIPs combined (Morgan Harris Burrows, 2003).

The evaluators credit the YIP with several achievements: (1) designing an innovative and coherent program that is grounded in criminological evidence of the risk factors that increase the likelihood of offending and what works in addressing those factors; and (2) the commitment to an empirical approach to program implementation and evaluation, in particular the process through which the top 50 at risk youth were identified (Morgan Harris Burrows, 2003). This program has demonstrated success in reducing crime among high-risk young people who are actively engaged; however, retention and intensive engagement of these young people appears to be a challenge.

The YJB provides funding to Youth Offender Teams (YOT) to implement a range of prevention programs with local partners. YOTs are multi-agency bodies that exist in every local authority in England and Wales and include representatives of police, probation, social services, education and health. A prevention target was set for YOTs in 2005 to reduce the number of first-time entrants to the youth justice system by 5% by 2008. The Youth Justice Board also provides funding to Crime Concern, an independent organization with a long history of successful implementation of youth justice programs, to deliver a number of YIPs and Junior YIPs. Crime Concern also runs the Positive Futures Program, a sports and activity based social inclusion program for young people, funded by the Home Office Drugs Strategy Directorate. It operates in 118 locations across England and Wales and aims to support young people living in some of the most socially deprived communities find routes back into education, volunteering and employment.

Anti-social behaviour orders

An anti-social behaviour order (ASBO) is a civil order designed to protect the community from behaviour that causes harassment, alarm or distress. ASBOs were introduced in the *Crime and Disorder Act* 1998 and reinforced by the 2003 *Anti-Social Behaviour Act*. Anti-social behaviour is defined in the *Crime and Disorder Act* as behaving “in a manner that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household...” The Respect Action Plan defines anti-social behaviour as “behaviours which can make life a misery for others, particularly in the most disadvantaged communities”. It is a broad term covering a wide range of behaviours making it difficult to develop a reliable set of indicators on its prevalence and trends (Solomon et al., 2007). A target was set in 1998 for 5,000 ASBOs to be issued annually from their introduction in 1999 (Solomon et al., 2007, p. 44). The number increases each year and in 2005 there were just over 4,000 issued (a total of 9,853 were issued between 1999 and 2005). The use of ASBOs varies significantly across the country.

ASBOs impose restrictions on the behaviour of individuals and aim to protect communities from often longstanding and intimidating activity. As they are civil orders, a person who receives an ASBO does not have a criminal record, although violation of an order is a criminal offence. ASBOs are in effect for a minimum of two years. Individual Support Orders (ISOs) have been available since 2004 and can be attached to an ASBO made against young people aged between 10 and 17 years old. They impose positive conditions on the young person and are designed to tackle the underlying causes of their anti-social behaviour.

An evaluation by the Youth Justice Board in 2006 found that the application of ASBOs varied by location, and could not be predicted by offender behaviour. In some cases, orders restricted normal daily activities which likely contributed to the breach rate of over 50% and some youth viewing the orders as a “badge of honour”. Practitioners who were interviewed about the role of ASBOs tended to see the orders as effective when applied appropriately (Youth Justice Board, 2006). A report by the National Audit Office found similar results. The NAO also found that anti-social behaviour interventions were mostly effective except with a small group of hard-core anti-social offenders (Comptroller & Auditor General, 2006).

Conclusion

The United Kingdom has undertaken an ambitious and comprehensive approach to tackling crime which met some but not all of its objectives. The centerpiece is the *Crime and Disorder Act* which established multi-agency crime prevention partnerships in every municipality across the UK. It mandates the creation of a centre of responsibility and a problem-solving process for identifying and responding to crime and safety problems. In addition, a relatively high level of funding was provided for prevention programs. This approach recognizes crime and disorder as multi-faceted problems that require coordinated multi-agency approaches.

The UK government set objectives and performance targets, used victimization survey data to assess performance, and encouraged local governments to

set additional targets of their own. A high degree of importance was attached to evaluation through which a knowledge base about effective crime reduction practices could be developed. Independent audits on the implementation and outcomes of the Crime Reduction Programme have determined that these efforts contributed to a reduction in crime as recorded by the British Crime Survey. In practice, however, all funded projects were not evaluated for effectiveness. And, although the BCS rather than police-recorded crime was used to track changes in victimization rates at the national level, it has limited utility at the local level. It is therefore difficult to state with certainty that changes in crime or victimization rates can be attributed to the Crime Reduction Programme or if other factors also played a role.

The UK experience contains valuable lessons about the importance of building capacity at the local level for data analysis and safety diagnoses, and identification and implementation of effective programs. To improve access to data, tools have been made available by the Audit Commission and other organizations which include community safety performance indicators, neighbourhood profiles, and quality of life indicators. Recognizing that community agencies may not have all the skills necessary for designing and implementing programs, agencies such as the Youth Justice Board and Crime Concern are available in communities throughout the UK to provide training and assistance. Knowledge is shared through websites and other avenues about what works and the specific mechanisms that lead to success.

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III. MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Comprehensive municipal crime prevention strategies have existed in several cities in continental Europe for over two decades. The European Forum for Urban Safety was set up in 1987 linking mayors and practitioners across Europe to develop community safety through strong city partnerships. Many declarations on municipal crime prevention and safety have since been issued calling on cities to take an active role in the coordination of initiatives that address the root causes of crime. The European Forum for Urban Safety, the Council of Europe and other international organizations have actively promoted this approach to urban crime prevention through numerous declarations (see Section I). This chapter will trace the development of municipal crime prevention initiatives and structures in France, Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands.

France

The French approach to crime prevention is characterized by links among national policies and programs regarding local development, social integration and urban renewal. It is under the responsibility of the Interdepartmental City Agency (*Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville – DIV*), which comes under the Minister of Housing and the City (*Ministre du Logement et de la Ville*). An advisory council to the government (*Conseil National des Villes*), formed of mayors, representatives of

various stakeholders and experts, also provides a forum for collaboration and has the capacity to make proposals on issues related to national urban policies and programs.

In 1982, a Commission of French Mayors on Crime Prevention (*Commission des Maires de France sur la prévention de la délinquance*) was set up to examine ways to improve community safety. The report of the commission is known as the Bonnemaïson report, from the name of its chairman who was then mayor of Epinay-sur-Seine and a member and speaker of the French National Assembly. Recommendations of the Bonnemaïson report included the creation of a national crime prevention council as well as municipal crime prevention councils (*Conseils communaux de prévention de la délinquance – CCPD*) which would bring together stakeholders and facilitate the coordination of crime prevention activities. Stakeholders include national agencies such as police, justice and education, municipal authorities and services, associations of residents, and non-governmental organizations (Waller, 1989). The number of CCPDs rose from 36 in 1983 to almost 850 at the end of the 1990s.

In 1985, local contracts for prevention and urban safety (*Contrats d'action de prévention pour la sécurité dans la ville – CAPS*) were initiated to provide a framework for the implementation of the priorities

established by the CCPDs and their various partners. The number of CAPS rose from 109 in 1985 to 697 in 1997.

The importance of reducing social exclusion, reinforcing crime and drug prevention, and promoting mediation were reiterated by the government of France in 1989. Additional funding was provided beginning in 1991 in support of the work of the CCPDs, in particular for the social integration of disadvantaged youth. In 1992, local safety plans (*Plans locaux de sécurité*) were put in place in an additional 27 urban areas (*Départements*) by the Ministry of the Interior and local authorities to increase the presence of the police and to improve relations with citizens. In 1994, the government indicated again the importance of an integrated approach to crime prevention in the larger framework of the city contracts (*Contrats de ville*), which were being developed at that time.

A new generation of local safety contracts (*Contrats locaux de sécurité – CLS*) was initiated in 1997. The contracts form a framework for partnerships and coordination of actions and commitments by different stakeholders, in particular in the most disadvantaged areas. They were to be based on local safety diagnoses and partnerships involving mayors, district administrators (*Préfets*), prosecutors (*Procureurs*) and other local stakeholders. However, members of the community do not have strong influence over the process (Bailleau, 2000; Ditcharry, 2000; Tachon, 2000). Close to 800 CLSs were developed in subsequent years.

In 2002, the CCPDs were replaced by new local safety and crime prevention councils (*Conseils locaux de sécurité et de prévention de la délinquance – CLSPD*). The objective is to reinforce that local councils are a

unique forum for coordination and partnerships as well as the key actor for implementation, evaluation and follow up of local safety contracts. The new CLSPS include three categories of members:

1. Local elected officials (both at the municipal and district levels);
2. Representatives from central government ministries (police, justice, education, health, social services, etc.); and
3. Other partners (such as resident associations, non-governmental organizations, municipal and district services, housing and transportation agencies).

The key challenge of the CLSPD is to better integrate the different dimensions of crime prevention: social crime prevention, situational crime prevention, prevention of recidivism, systematic response to crime, civic participation, mediation and support of victims of crime. About 50 local or metropolitan crime observatories (*Observatoires locaux de la délinquance*) have also been developed over the years in order to better monitor crime data and trends.

At the end of 2006, the government issued a set of guidelines for local safety contracts in each municipality of 10,000 residents or more and for municipalities with disadvantaged areas. The importance of the methodology is stressed (local safety diagnosis, indicators, follow up, evaluation). The new contracts should aim at:

1. Clarifying the organization of the local planning and coordination structures related to safety and crime prevention;

2. Developing a comprehensive crime prevention strategy for the most vulnerable areas; and
3. Developing an action plan based on the local crime problems and challenges.

New national legislation on crime prevention was adopted in 2007 which emphasizes a key role for mayors in implementing and coordinating the crime prevention policy at the local level (*Loi relative à la prévention de la délinquance*). National coordination and support also includes an Interdepartmental Crime Prevention Committee (*Comité interministériel pour la prévention de la délinquance*) and an Interdepartmental Fund for Crime Prevention (*Fonds interministériel pour la prévention de la délinquance*). As implementation and outcomes have not been evaluated, it is not possible to comment on the success of these initiatives.

Belgium

At the beginning of the 1990s the government of Belgium recognized the importance of addressing the issues of crime and insecurity in the larger context of urban development and social integration. Local authorities were called upon to play a key role in implementing and coordinating specific crime prevention actions adapted to the needs of each municipality. A national secretariat for the prevention policy was set up (*Secrétariat permanent à la politique de prévention*) and local safety and prevention contracts were initiated.

In 1992 and 1993, 35 contracts were signed with local authorities. The contracts had two main components: the improvement of local police services and prevention activities. About two-thirds

of the budget was allocated to the police component and the prevention activities focused more on situational and technical crime prevention than on social prevention. In 1995, the contracts were modified to include new components on justice and safety guards (*vigiles urbains*). From 1997, a new societal contract (*contrat de société*) was added to undertake urban renewal initiatives (Swinnen, Hoste & de Gruijter 2005).

In 1999, the national government started to develop the concept of global safety (*sécurité intégrale*) that takes into account the factors contributing to crime and insecurity and that fosters an integrated approach to improving community safety. This policy focuses on prevention, enforcement and monitoring and relies on the cooperation and coordination of all levels of government. A national safety plan was adopted for the period 1999-2003 and nine priority areas were identified. Local authorities were expected to give priority to violent crime, youth delinquency, hooliganism and to crime and nuisances related to drugs. The local safety contracts were renamed safety and prevention contracts (*contrats de sécurité et de prévention*). Specific plans by geographic zones were established for the police as part of a new integrated approach. Provincial authorities and the Brussels region have also been providing additional support to local authorities in relation to crime prevention in the framework of different policies and programs under their responsibility. In 2004, a new national policy framework was adopted as well as a second national safety plan covering the period 2004-2007. In 2005, the national secretariat for the prevention policy was renamed the local global safety directorate (*Direction sécurité locale intégrale*).

In 2002, the criteria to receive financial support through the local safety and prevention contracts were revised. To qualify a municipality must:

1. Have a population of 60,000 or more;
2. Be among the municipalities where the per capita crime rate is the highest; and
3. Be among the municipalities where the average per capita income is the lowest.

In 2006, 73 cities and municipalities had in place a safety and prevention contract. The total annual budget of these contracts is close to 34 millions euros.

A new generation of local safety and prevention contracts are being put in place for the period 2007-2010. The new strategic safety and prevention plans (*Plans stratégiques de sécurité et de prévention*) will focus more on expected results and a local safety diagnosis. Attention will be given to the synergy between the preventative actions of the police and the initiatives undertaken by the local partners. A committee will also be set up to monitor and evaluate the different plans. As in France, there is a lack of assessment of the implementation or outcomes of these activities.

Sweden

The National Council for Crime Prevention was implemented in Sweden in 1974 as a response to an increase in reported crime. Its mandate is to produce official crime statistics (including monthly breakdowns at the city level), evaluate law reforms, conduct research, disseminate knowledge about what works to reduce crime, and provide support for local crime prevention initiatives. The Council also works in collaboration with other agencies and organizations to lobby policy-makers and other actors in the crime

prevention field. Main areas of focus for the Council's work have included youth crime, economic crime, environmental crime, violence against women and support for community crime prevention initiatives (Brå, 2007).

In 1996, the Swedish government established a national crime prevention program entitled *A Collective Responsibility* designed to strengthen crime prevention work in the country. Local authorities were to organize their crime prevention work through local crime prevention boards. Local boards are made up of representatives from police, local government, social services and educational institutions. A 2005 study found that most local boards had implemented some form of practical crime prevention measure—often concerning drug and alcohol prevention for youth or car-related theft prevention—and had taken steps to evaluate their interventions. Like some other jurisdictions, Swedish local boards are challenged with a shortage of resources and low levels of commitment from some participating agencies. The study found that local councils that have been in existence for a relatively long period of time generally implement intensive programs, conduct surveys of local problems, establish programs and action plans, and evaluate their activities. It has been recommended that the National Council for Crime Prevention assume a more significant role in guiding and providing support to local initiatives (Gustafsson & Hollari, 2005). The Council is looking in the future to explore issues of crime policy that fall outside the criminal justice system by involving the whole society in crime prevention planning and research, including a greater focus on the increasing multiculturalism of Swedish society (Andresson, 2005).

The Netherlands

In 2007, the Dutch government announced a coalition agreement between the parliamentary parties of the Christian Democratic Alliance, the Labour Party, and the Christian Union. This proposed policy is founded on six pillars: an active role in Europe and the world; an innovative and competitive economy; a sustainable living environment; social cohesion; safety, stability, and respect; and government and public services. Pillars four and five are most closely related to strategies of crime prevention. The government also plans to “go on the offensive” with problem neighbourhoods through coordination with housing, the business community, police, schools, citizens and other agencies. Included in this effort is a focus on children through the creation of organizations and centres that support youth and parents.

This policy agreement comes on the heels of *Towards a Safer Society* in 2002, a project of the Ministry of Justice that contains more specific objectives, for example to reduce crime and victimization in the Netherlands by 25% between 2008 and 2010, compared to 2002/2003 rates. A part of this project is the Netherlands preventive Action Plan against Violence that focuses on early intervention, perpetrators and victims (Ministry of Justice, 2005). This plan requires the mobilization of municipalities, businesses and citizens with the support of central government to implement community initiatives, engage bystanders and disseminate best practices. Some of the targeted areas for violence prevention

include alcohol consumption, illegal possession of weapons, and harmful media images. The plan will look at preventing violence in entertainment districts, on public transport, in sports, in schools and in the workplace. An emphasis on individual, familial, social, and cultural risk factors informs this plan which will also provide better reintegration and training for offenders, and more support and a greater role in criminal proceedings for victims. One of the future tasks of the Action Plan is to establish criteria and instruments for evaluation in order to measure the best, most promising practices in violence prevention.

Conclusion

Central governments in these European countries have been supporting local government to implement inter-sectoral planning processes in efforts to prevent crime and improve community safety. Crime prevention councils or an equivalent responsibility centre at the national government level have played a major role in providing funding and direction to municipalities. Initiatives in these countries include a range of approaches such as social development, problem solving partnerships, situational crime prevention and enforcement. Often they include units that bring data together to improve planning. However, they have not set up processes for evaluating the implementation or the extent to which they achieve outcomes such as reductions in victimization or enhanced feelings of safety. Targets have not been as prominent as in the UK and victimization survey data have not been widely used to assess progress.



IV. MUNICIPAL-LEVEL INITIATIVES IN THE UNITED STATES

Numerous national organizations in the United States have actively promoted collaborative sustainable solutions to community safety problems. The National Crime Prevention Council has worked with nearly three dozen US cities, helping them examine their resources and needs and develop coalitions with community leaders to address local problems and plan for the future (National Crime Prevention Council, 1999; 2001). The US National League of Cities' Public Safety and Crime Prevention committee drafted a 2006 National Municipal Policy that emphasized municipal governments' role in ensuring public safety. In these, prevention forms part of an integrated strategy with intervention and punishment; it is seen as a way to get at the root causes of crime and violence.

The US Conference of Mayors (USCM) represents over 1,000 cities with populations of 30,000 or more. In partnership with the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and the European Forum on Urban Safety, they participated in the first North American European Conference on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention in Montreal in 1989, followed by the International Conference on Urban Safety, Drugs and Crime Prevention in Paris in 1991. These conferences resulted in an Agenda for Safer Cities and an implementation guide. Recommendations included national strategies and support for local

efforts and the importance of comprehensive, long-term initiatives. On its website, the USCM promotes best practices for safer neighbourhoods through community policing, especially for gang violence prevention, and a number of different initiatives targeting domestic violence at the municipal level.⁸

An increase in violent crime in the United States in the mid-1980s and rapid decline in the 1990s gave rise to much speculation and competing claims about what could have been behind these trends. The role of handguns, changes in police practices, the rise in the use of incarceration especially for drug offences, shifting drug cultures, demographic factors, and the ideologies of certain mayors and police commissioners were all debated (see Blumstein & Wallman, 2000). This section will describe several specific initiatives that were implemented in American cities during a time of rapidly declining crime rates and will show that innovative multi-agency responses were credited with at least some of the change in crime rates in these cities.

New York City

Perhaps one of the better known American "success" stories of crime reduction occurred in New York City. The social context in New York in the latter half of the 1980s was such that the use of crack cocaine was

8 http://usmayors.org/uscm/best_practices/search.asp

sweeping through disadvantaged neighbourhoods, AIDS was on the rise, and homelessness was a constant feature of the city. Growing proportions of young men were at risk of involvement in crime due to the lucrative drug trade in crack cocaine and the availability of guns (Bowling, 1999). In 1990, gun violence raged and the homicide rate reached an all-time high claiming 2,245 victims (Karmen, 2000, p. 23). Homicides fell to 633 by 1998, an unprecedented decline in the history of New York City. Assault, rape, robbery, burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft also declined significantly over this period.

Intervention

The story of New York City's crime decline begins with the clean-up of the city's subway system (Kelling & Bratton, 1998). In the late 1980s, the state of New York City's subways was "nightmarish", plagued by panhandlers, fare jumpers, public urination, homeless and mentally unstable people, and violence. Together with the Transit Police, the New York Police Department engaged in a problem-solving exercise to properly understand the nature of the problems. The disorder was dealt with through the elimination of graffiti, environmental design and target hardening, social services for the homeless and training for officers. The success of these efforts in reducing crime and disorder in the subway served as a pilot test for applying the "broken windows" theory more broadly to crime in New York City. In this approach, minor offences are treated seriously in order to prevent more serious problems from developing (Wilson & Kelling, 1982).

In 1994, when William Bratton became Commissioner of the NYPD, a management consultant was hired to reengineer the way the

NYPD did business and a major overhaul was set in motion. An important innovation was a computer-based statistical monitoring system known as Compstat which was used for hot spot analysis and identification of emerging crime problems. With the help of Compstat, Commissioner Bratton held precinct commanders personally accountable for reducing crime in their areas. Regular meetings were held where senior officers were grilled about actions they were taking to reduce crime and apprehend offenders. The number of uniformed officers increased and the NYPD embarked on a zero tolerance campaign against persistent petty offenders with a focus on aggressive panhandling, prostitution, drug arrests, public urination and drunkenness (Kelling & Sousa, 2001). Stop-and-frisk searches, vehicle stops and checks for outstanding arrest warrants were undertaken to intercept drug selling and using, bail and probation and parole violations, and weapons carrying (Karmen, 2000, p. 93). The Police Commissioner and Mayor Giuliani gave credit to this aggressive law enforcement approach for a substantial drop in crime (Henry, 2003; Kelling & Bratton, 1998; Kelling & Sousa, 2001; Waller, 2006).

Some commentators hesitate to attribute New York's crime decline solely to aggressive law enforcement. First, crime rates in New York were declining prior to these changes (Eck & Macquire, 2000). Second, New York City was not alone in recording sharp declines in crime in the 1990s: other American cities were witnessing similar or greater declines during the same period but without the same aggressive policing strategies (Fagan, Zimring & Kim, 1998). Third, others argue that while the Compstat package of reforms made an important contribution to crime declines, other social changes

during that time also must be taken into account, such as demographic shifts in the number of poor minority young men in the population, the rise in young people attending college which may have led to a rejection of anti-social values by large numbers of youth, a change in drug use patterns, and community crime prevention initiatives (Bowling, 1999; Johnson, Golub, & Dunlap, 2000; Karmen, 2000; Wintemute, 2000). Some have raised concerns that aggressive enforcement of minor offences represents “harassment policing”; this can have negative long-term effects on communities and on police-community relations and can clog the courts and further disadvantage young men who receive criminal records for relatively minor offences (Eck & Maguire, 2000; Karmen, 2000; Rosenbaum, 2007).

Interest in the Compstat model of policing grew rapidly; it has now been adopted by more than one-third of police departments in the United States with 100 or more officers (Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally & Greenspan, 2006 as cited in Rosenbaum, 2007). However, there is some question as to whether the key elements of a successful Compstat approach—a clear mission or crime reduction goals, internal accountability, authority granted to area commanders to develop solutions to local problems, organizational flexibility, data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of crime-reduction efforts, and innovative problem-solving tactics—are implemented in all cases (Weisburd, Mastrofski, Willis & Greenspan, 2006 as cited in Rosenbaum, 2007). Other US cities that have adopted the Compstat approach have not had the same success as New York City. This may be due to the unique character of that city during that period of time.

Boston

The situation in Boston during the 1980s and the early 1990s was characterized by street gangs engaging in drug dealing, gun violence, and murder, often involving repeat and chronic offenders and repeat victims. This situation was amplified by poor relationships between the black residents of these inner-city neighbourhoods and police. Much of the violence was linked to the crack cocaine wave of the late 1980s and the fear among young people that they were at risk of violence and needed to carry guns for self-protection (Kennedy, Braga, Piehl, & Waring, 2001). Following the intervention of the Boston Gun Project, the city experienced significant reductions in levels of crime: a 31% reduction in property crime, a 16% reduction in violent crime, and a 29% reduction in overall crime (Kennedy et al., 2001; National Crime Prevention Council, 1999).

Intervention

A working group was convened in Boston in 1995, consisting of police, researchers from Harvard University and frontline practitioners from a variety of agencies. Its mandate was to explore problem-oriented policing approaches to youth homicide. With funding from the National Institute of Justice, a coordinating group was established to develop an in-depth understanding of the nature and causes of youth violence in the city and design coordinated strategies to combat it.

An analysis of the problem revealed that at the crux was gang violence involving chronic offenders who had easy access to firearms and were concentrated in a few neighbourhoods. The working group developed a response that involved direct communication with gang members and a “pulling levers” deterrence

strategy in which offenders were told that any violence would be met with swift and certain law enforcement action. “Operation Ceasefire”, as it became known, is a problem-oriented policing intervention aimed at interrupting the dynamic of violence in which gang members and less structured groups of young people are involved (Kennedy et al., 2001). Problem-oriented policing uses an iterative approach of problem identification, data analysis, response to the problem, evaluation and adjustment of the response (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001). Police officers in Boston arranged meetings with violent gang members to encourage the cessation of firearm violence through threats of swift and sure prosecution. Through direct communication with the youth, police reinforced that a certain, rapid and severe law enforcement response would follow any infractions should the violence continue (Braga & Winship, 2005; Kennedy et al., 2001; National Crime Prevention Council, 1999). Social services, youth street workers and influential people in offenders’ lives, such as community and family members, were present to back up the message that the violence must stop and to offer help for those who wanted it. This communication strategy was intended to filter through to, and affect the behaviour of, other gangs and individuals not directly receiving attention (Braga et al., 2001). The decline in youth homicides following the implementation of this strategy was dramatic: the number of youth homicides averaged 44 per year between 1991 and 1995, fell to 26 in 1996 and 15 in 1997 (Kennedy et al., 2001).

Operation Ceasefire was an experiment that lacked a control group; with this type of intervention it is difficult to exclude certain gangs or neighbourhoods for the purposes of comparison. But an impact evaluation suggests that the intervention was a

very effective one for the city of Boston during the time it was implemented (Braga et al., 2001). Violence was a self-sustaining cycle and once this dynamic was interrupted, altercations did not spin out of control in the same way they had previously. Violence tended to involve a small number of high-rate offending groups and tended to arise from long-standing personal beefs and vendettas and issues related to respect. The direct communication with offenders—central to the Ceasefire approach—sets it apart from a traditional law enforcement strategy which aims to take offenders off the street, eliminate gangs or increase arrests or prison terms. Nor was it composed of the classic elements of crime prevention programs which aim to change offenders’ character or address risk factors in the offender’s family or the environment.

Operation Ceasefire is an example of key leadership and community partnerships aimed at reducing violence in the near-term. The project demonstrates the importance of:

- Using a problem-solving model;
- Developing an accurate understanding of the nature and dimensions of the problem;
- Establishing a locus of responsibility;
- A willingness to use innovation and accept uncertainty; and
- Incorporating the knowledge of frontline practitioners and academic outsiders (Kennedy et al., 2001).

A safety diagnosis, conducted by analyzing crime data, determined that about 75% of the city’s homicides were gang-related, involving repeat victims and offenders (Kennedy et al., 2001). The working group’s action plan placed a clear priority on dealing

with firearm violence, but it did not target risk factors for engaging in violence, such as poverty, dropping out of school, or drug abuse (Kennedy et al., 2001). It was argued that in very troubled neighbourhoods with high levels of violence and mistrust between residents and the police, community development and efforts to address risk factors cannot take place until the violence is reduced. The central idea behind this approach is to help each community find its voice, broaden anti-violence norms and de-value anti-social norms.

The Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) and Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN)

Following the success of Operation Ceasefire, the US Department of Justice launched the Strategic Approach to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) in ten cities to determine whether this collaborative, data-driven problem-solving process could be replicated elsewhere. The SACSI strategies in each city were developed and guided by multi-agency, multi-disciplinary groups led by the US Attorney's Office and managed by full-time project coordinators. Research was well integrated into the strategic planning and problem-solving of each group (Roehl, Rosenbaum, Costello, Coldren, Schuck, Kunard, & Forde, 2006). The US Department of Justice provided technical assistance, including assistance with computerized geographic mapping. Nine of the ten SACSI sites targeted homicide and other serious violent crimes and one focused on reducing rape and other sexual assaults.

An evaluation of the ten sites found that the SACSI approach is associated with reductions in targeted

violent crime, sometimes by as much as 50% (Roehl et al., 2006). Successful elements of the SACSI approach include:

- Strong leadership provided by U.S. Attorney's Offices;
- Integration of research;
- Collaborative strategic planning;
- Core group of decision-makers and working groups;
- Building on the foundations of prior collaborative efforts at the local level; and
- A range of intervention strategies directed at both suppressing and preventing crime.

The SACSI programs were implemented in communities with varying local conditions, different forms of partnerships and different intervention philosophies yet had similar rates of success by applying common principles. When problems were reported, they were most likely to involve insufficient funding or staffing, and tensions between members with different philosophies and organizational cultures.

All ten SACSI programs have continued under the umbrella of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), retaining the key features of SACSI but focusing more narrowly on gun crimes. PSN is a nationwide network of local programs that receives \$1.1 billion in federal funding (Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2006). The US Attorney oversees an inter-agency task force in each federal court district comprised of local, state and federal law enforcement agencies, community partners and researchers. The five core elements of PSN are partnerships, strategic planning, training, community outreach and accountability, although law enforcement, aggressive prosecution and punishment play central roles as well (American

Prosecutors Research Institute, 2002). Communities are involved through identifying assets, assessing readiness, assessing gun violence prevention activities, and through involvement in offender notification meetings (Institute for Law and Justice, 2005; Papachristos et al., 2006). Research partners help analyze local gun problems, trends and contexts.

PSN is backed by high-level political leadership; it is endorsed by the Bush Administration in partnership with such agencies as the US Department of Justice, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National District Attorneys Association. PSN also partners with academic institutions such as the American University, the Academy for Educational Development, and the Institute for Law and Justice.

An evaluation of the impact of PSN on neighbourhood level crime rates in Chicago showed promising results: interventions were associated with a 35% decline in homicide when compared to control neighbourhoods (Papachristos et al., 2006). This evaluation analyzed four interventions: (1) increased federal prosecutions for convicted offenders carrying or using guns; (2) the length of sentences associated with federal prosecutions; (3) reducing the supply of firearms by intervening in illegal gun markets; and, (4) social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through direct communication with offenders. The largest effect was shown for offender notification meetings that seek to alter social norms and change the perceived likelihood and costs of arrest. Further evaluation is needed to explore the specific aspects of the offender forums that are associated with the drop in crime (Papachristos et al., 2006).

Weed and Seed

Weed and Seed is a tri-level governmental American mobilization and coordination strategy to reduce violent and drug-related crime and increase safety in communities. Administered within the US Department of Justice, this strategy uses concentrated law enforcement in focus areas (weeding out offenders) and then provides community policing and social services, including youth activities and neighbourhood revitalization projects, in the same area (seeding opportunities). A national evaluation of eight Weed and Seed sites in the 1990s found mixed, but promising results (Dunworth, Mills, Corder & Greene, 1999). Six of the Weed and Seed sites showed declines in crime rates in their second year of implementation as compared to the year prior to the initiative. Six of the sites reported only little or some improvement in public perceptions of crime, public safety and police performance. The effectiveness of Weed and Seed implementation and on levels of crime and public safety were dependent on the readiness of the community (infrastructure, social cohesion), early seeding and sustained weeding, focused programming, active and constructive leadership, and bottom-up participatory decision-making practices.

With the rapid expansion of Weed and Seed programs in the US, the number of sites is exceeding the funding allocated to the strategy. To address this problem, the Department of Justice has released best practices for Weed and Seed based on evaluations in individual municipalities. For example, the University of Oregon evaluated a Weed and Seed site in Bethel, Oregon and found the effectiveness of public safety forums and public safety stations rests on the relationship between community

members and the police. Also, the implementation of Weed and Seed in Buffalo, New York resulted in the following recommendations: set priorities and develop strategies; find partners and collaborate; set benchmarks; address quality-of-life issues; learn from other sites; sustain adequate levels of staffing; and find time to reflect and regroup (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2004).

Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy

In 1991, the homicide rate in Chicago was fourth highest in the United States. Drugs and trafficking were widespread on city streets and gun violence was proliferating. Local officials were convinced that crime and fear of crime were linked to social disorder and the physical decay of neighbourhoods. A shift in policing style was implemented in Chicago in five neighbourhoods in 1993, coinciding with a decline in crime rates in that city. Known as the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), it adopted a community policing strategy in which police were trained and encouraged to interact with community members to better understand and solve local problems in order to reduce crime and fear (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Waller, 2006). Expansion of the strategy began in 1994 to include other neighbourhoods in the city.

Chicago criminologist Wesley Skogan (1990) demonstrated how physical and social disorder—vacant lots and abandoned buildings, panhandling, graffiti, prostitution, public drinking, and litter—can have negative impacts on neighbourhoods, such as rising crime rates and fear. Some of these, such as public drinking, vandalism and prostitution (in some forms), are illegal while others are not but their

ongoing presence may be perceived by citizens as signifying unmanageable problems over which they and the police have lost control. Disorder can foster fear and social withdrawal. If citizens retreat from public spaces, this generates more disorder which then may flourish into criminal activity. According to Skogan (1990), disorder in neighbourhoods is closely related to crime, fear of crime, and a belief that crime is a problem. By targeting disorder, police can reduce crime and fear and improve the quality of life for residents.

While police have historically been involved in maintaining public order, advances in technology and changing mandates have contributed to a narrowing focus for many police forces. By focusing on more serious crimes, police officers may be neglecting some of the disorder that residents regard as more problematic. Strategies of community policing, like CAPS, are efforts to reorient police practices (Skogan, 1990).

CAPS involves assigning police officers to particular neighbourhoods to get to know the citizens and the crime and disorder problems that are important to them (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). A team of eight or nine beat officers are assigned to one of Chicago's 279 beat areas for a term of at least one year. This facilitates relationship-building with the members of the community to solve specific problems in tailored ways. Aside from neighbourhood crime problems, the beat officers also try to solve problems around abandoned buildings and vacant lots that might harbour unwanted activity.

CAPS recognizes that the police alone can not solve crime problems. A key ingredient of this strategy includes forming partnerships with community

groups and agencies to deal with neighbourhood disorder problems. This proactive problem-solving approach is most effective when problems are first identified and solutions developed and implemented with citizen involvement.

An evaluation of CAPS (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997) found that residents in most police districts noticed positive changes in police practices during the first year of implementation, including improved response to community concerns. The most effective meetings were ones where the police and community members shared a leadership role and there was balanced participation between the two groups. A victimization survey found that major crime problems declined in all areas, though rates also declined in two control areas at the same time (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). Residents perceived that crime in their neighbourhoods had decreased.

Based on these positive results, the Chicago Police Department has invested more resources in the strategy. The city has hired and trained more police officers in the CAPS style, developed information-sharing computer software that allows officers to map crime hot spots, and engaged in a more comprehensive planning process. This strategy helps the police and citizens translate community policing into action in their own neighbourhoods.

Communities that Care

Communities that Care (CTC) is a research-based conceptual framework that is used to guide communities in selecting the most effective

policies, actions and programs to promote youth development. It does this by targeting the unique risk and protection needs of each community (Hawkins, 1999). It was first developed by American professors David Hawkins and Richard Catalano at the University of Washington in Seattle in the 1990s, but has since spread to more than 600 communities in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and Australia. The United States Department of Justice adopted the model for their Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), and the US Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration recently acquired the program for use within their Strategic Prevention Framework. Although not designed specifically as a crime prevention program, CTC targets many risk factors for delinquency such as school failure, substance abuse, school dropout and teen pregnancy and thus has an impact on reducing crime (Channing Bete, 2006; Toumbourou, 1999).

CTC is an operating system that can be adapted to the needs of the local community. It provides validated tools, including a youth survey⁹, to assess risk and protective factors in the community, schools, families, peers and individuals. The community's profile is then matched with tested programs, and communities can choose those that best suit their specific needs. Programs for youth development are varied and promote social, emotional, cognitive, behavioural and moral competence; foster resilience, self-efficacy, and self-determination; and, provide opportunities for pro-social involvement and recognition for positive behaviour (Catalano, Berglund, Ryan, Lonczak, & Hawkins, 2004). Certified trainers are

⁹ The CTC youth survey covers a broad range of risk and protective factors identified by longitudinal research across the domains of community, school, family, peer and individual, health and behaviour outcomes as contributing to such maladaptive behaviours as drug abuse and delinquency (Arthur, Hawkins, Pollard, Catalano, & Baglioni, 2002)

available to help ensure the major aspects of CTC are applied correctly. The effective functioning of CTC is contingent on the successful implementation of the following five phases (Hawkins, 1999).

1. Community readiness: youth development and the prevention of youth crime is a community priority; community members are ready to work together toward this shared goal.
2. Community mobilization: involvement of key community players; the development of an organizational structure headed by a community board to facilitate the creation of a local prevention strategy.
3. Safety diagnosis: an assessment of community strengths and weaknesses, available resources, crime challenges, and specific risk and protective factors; identification of geographic areas in greatest need.
4. Comprehensive youth development plan: outline desired outcomes by using the safety diagnosis as a baseline. Clarify what policies, actions, and programs need to be implemented to address risk and protective factors.
5. Implementation and evaluation: implement new programs or expand on existing resources or services. Monitor progress toward desired outcomes develop a plan for evaluation.

This model is flexible enough to accommodate community-level differences in need and risk, and to implement actions to address the specific needs of communities (Hawkins, Van Horn, & Arthur, 2004). In a report to US Congress about the effectiveness of CTC, OJJDP (1996) identified several important impacts of the CTC model: improved inter-agency collaboration, reduced duplication of services, coordinated allocation of services, strategic

targeting of prevention activities to priority risk and protective factors, increased use of research-based promising approaches with demonstrated effectiveness, increased involvement of professionals, and involvement of citizens and youth in community prevention activities.

External evaluations of CTC implementation have found promising evidence for the effectiveness of the model in reducing youth crime and delinquency. Greenberg and Feinberg (2005) evaluated the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency's CTC pilot program in 1999-2000 and found no significant impacts on rates of child abuse, poverty, or teen pregnancy in relation to the system. When Feinberg, Greenberg, Osgood, Sartorius & Bontempo (2007) evaluated the same program in 2001 and 2003, they found the CTC model reduced risk factors and improved outcomes and there was evidence of CTC influence on delinquent behaviour. Further, there were greater effects in 2003 than 2001, suggesting that the earlier evaluation might have been conducted at a time when it was too early to detect significant impacts.

In the UK, an evaluation of three CTC projects identified key factors related to success of the CTC model: community readiness, coordination and management infrastructure, consultation and communication, sustained funding, and management of staff turnover (Crow, France, & Hacking, 2006). The development and implementation of CTC in five cities in the Netherlands since 2000 has showed promising results in terms of improving the quality of decision-making and planning regarding youth development, improving collaboration between agencies, and increasing the use of research-based effective prevention programs (Boutellier, 2006).

Similar confidence is building surrounding pilot projects in Canada and Australia (Flynn, 2006; Toumbourou, 1999). In Canada, CTC is currently being implemented in several communities in Eastern Ontario, three communities in Northern Ontario, and in Squamish, British Columbia (La Roche & Flynn, 2007). The Centre for Research on Community Services (CRCS) at the University of Ottawa is actively involved in the projects together with local community agencies and school boards. The project in Squamish has been ongoing since 1999 and has identified four risk factors as priorities for action:¹⁰

1. Poor family management (including discipline and supervision);
2. Laws and norms favourable to drug use;
3. Perceived availability of drugs; and
4. Context of family stressors/extreme economic deprivation.

In Northern Ontario, CTC implementation is focusing on school and family based risk and protective factors. The CTC Youth Survey was administered to French and English grade nine students in early 2006 to assess anti-social behaviour, substance use, and their risk and protective profile. The survey will be repeated in early 2008.

Conclusion

Many of the crime prevention initiatives in the United States have a strong law enforcement component, sometimes to the exclusion of programs that address the root causes of crime. Compstat technology and aggressive policing were claimed by the police

leadership and the mayor to have caused the sharp drop in violent crime in New York City in the 1990s and early 2000s but analysts question the magnitude of the impact caused by policing strategies alone. Given that crime declined in other cities at the same time where aggressive policing was not adopted, it is likely that the drop was due at least in part to other social changes.

Problem-oriented policing strategies combined with targeted social services have been shown to have an impact on violent crime. In Boston, youth homicides were effectively reduced when police partnered with community agencies and researchers, created a centre of responsibility with strong leadership, and used data and the expertise of frontline practitioners to understand the nature of the problem. Pulling levers, weeding and seeding, and Project Safe Neighborhood approaches emphasize concentrated law enforcement to control violence and gun-related crime. In Chicago, partnerships between problem-oriented policing strategies and local neighbourhoods were successful in reducing local crime and disorder.

Communities that Care has been widely implemented throughout the United States and is a good example of an approach that uses validated tools to identify risk and protection factors present in children's lives, develop an action plan, and select the most effective actions to address local problems. It is harder to know the exact contribution of Weed and Seed but it combines social prevention, neighborhood involvement and law enforcement.

Overall, a recurring theme is the importance of building crime prevention and community safety

¹⁰ <http://www.ctcsquamish.com/index.html>

strategies on solid evidence of the nature of local problems and what works to address these problems. Problem-solving partnerships that combine problem-oriented policing—adequately resourced—with targeted social services and involvement of neighbours and families seem to have considerable promise and some evidence to suggest they can reduce crime. Tough law enforcement on its own may reduce

crime but it risks negative impacts on disadvantaged communities and increased cost to taxpayers which may outweigh the benefits over the longer term. The lack of permanent responsibility centres for crime prevention at the municipal level in the USA means that problems solved often recur and partnerships between key agencies are rarely sustained.

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V. CRIME PREVENTION INITIATIVES IN AUSTRALIA

Like other federated states, Australia faces challenges in coordinating crime prevention between the federal, state/territorial and municipal governments. However, Australia faces additional difficulties in adapting the Bonnemaïson model, due to the different powers and responsibilities of local governments in Australia. Whereas local governments in most European nations have responsibility for health, education and social welfare, in Australia, responsibility falls to state/territorial governments (Homel, 2005).

Over the past 20 years, Australian federal and state/territorial governments have focused on the community development model of crime prevention with an emphasis on partnerships among communities, governments and business (Homel, 2005). At the federal level, the first major national crime prevention program was initiated in 1995 with the Safer Australia initiative, followed by the National Campaign Against Violence and Crime under a new government in 1996. A number of priority issues were identified and much effort went into capacity building. In 2004, the federal government announced the National Community Crime Prevention Program (NCCPP). The NCCPP is primarily a national community grants program to support grass roots projects organized at the local level that are designed to prevent crime and improve community safety. Funding is available to projects that demonstrate strong community partnerships,

target priority areas and provide ongoing benefit to the community. All funding is directed to the non-governmental sector.

State-level strategies

The Department of Justice in the state of Victoria, through the *Safer Streets and Homes* initiative, seeks to establish a comprehensive state-wide partnership with local governments to identify and address the needs of local communities by building on existing structures (Homel, 2005). In 2006, a collaboration between Victoria University and the former Crime Prevention Victoria evaluated community governance structures as a vehicle for effective crime prevention (Armstrong, Francis & Totikidis, 2006). Community governance essentially refers to the structures and processes for decision-making, accountability and control at the community level. These include partnerships and networks among agencies, businesses and government departments that are responsible for decision-making at the local level. This “whole of government” approach is intended to help harness the combined resources and expertise of governments, non-governmental organizations, the corporate sector and local citizens. The evaluation focused on Local Safety Committees (LSCs) which were established to develop multi-agency community safety plans, and act as a catalyst for coordinating joint efforts by local and state government on crime-related issues.

The study concluded that LSCs were valuable in raising the profile of crime prevention and helping partners work together to produce policies and plans. Visible results and recognition were found to be important for sustaining involvement. The committees were successful in bringing together different government departments to address community problems. However, unless local council was significantly involved, decisions lacked local accountability and community recognition. The study recommends ensuring representation of all sectors in LSCs—including medical and public health, trade unions, the media, education and other groups—in order for communities to feel ownership over the direction and decisions made. Performance indicators should be developed that focus on the relationships between crime, social conditions and well-being. Targets for improvement should be set, change monitored and data shared. There is also a need to foster commitment to partnerships among senior staff in participating agencies to ensure that members of LSCs have decision-making authority (Armstrong et al., 2006).

In the state of New South Wales, the Attorney General's Department has made toolkits available to local communities to assist them in developing their own crime prevention plans. Communities are encouraged to work out a detailed local crime profile, establish a crime prevention committee, research and develop crime prevention projects, negotiate partnerships, write a plan of action that includes evaluation, seek endorsement and funding, and implement the plan. An evidence-based approach that prioritizes needs analysis, program analysis, and evaluation of interventions is strongly promoted.

Detailed descriptions, evaluations of individual projects and evaluation guides are available on the Crime Prevention Division website.¹¹

Building Safer Communities is the Queensland government's strategy for addressing the underlying circumstances that lead to crime and victimization. Crime prevention programs are to be planned through active community consultation and engagement with a focus on monitoring and evaluating interventions. The main goals of this strategy are to strengthen communities and support families and young people in areas of high crime or high need by using evidence-based prevention strategies in housing, education, employment, and support for families. In their *Strategic Framework for Community Crime Prevention*, the Queensland government offers support to local initiatives through infrastructure to ensure their sustainability. Building Safer Communities Action Teams facilitate collaboration between local governments, social services, police, businesses, and special interest groups in developing and implementing local solutions to crime prevention problems. These teams are also responsible for evaluating outcomes of local action plans.

Since 1989, the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) of South Australia's Department of Justice has worked with police, government departments, and community agencies to help respond to crime problems. The CPU provides consulting services on best practices and helps to pioneer new crime prevention strategies and policies based on experiential knowledge, as well as to develop policy-based research and evaluation. The work of the CPU is based on theory, empirical evidence and effective

11 http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/cpd/ll_cpd.nsf/pages/CPD_index

partnerships. The CPU has utilized CPTED, developmental crime prevention and community crime prevention projects to address such crime problems as property crime, domestic violence and crime involving youth and Indigenous people.

Conclusion

There is encouragement and support from the federal and state governments in Australia for the development of multi-agency partnerships and use of the evidence base to address crime and safety problems at the community level. In Victoria, Local Safety Committees were established to develop multi-agency community safety plans, and coordinate the efforts of local and state government on crime-related issues. The government of New South Wales actively promotes an evidence-based approach that includes

a needs analysis, program analysis, and evaluation of interventions and provides detailed descriptions and evaluations of individual projects on its website. The Queensland government recommends that crime prevention programs be planned through active community engagement, multi-agency collaboration, and a focus on monitoring and evaluating interventions. Support is offered to local initiatives to ensure their sustainability. The government of South Australia provides advice on best practices and helps to pioneer new crime prevention strategies and policies based on knowledge.

With the exception of some important projects, there are no independent evaluations to know to what extent multi-sectoral approaches have been successful in reducing rates of victimization or improving feelings of safety.

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VI. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Safer Cities – UN-Habitat

The Second Conference of the United Nations on Human Establishments held in Istanbul in 1996 identified urban safety as a key element of urban planning and good governance. Mayors in many African cities have recognized the need for a comprehensive approach to urban safety, a strategy that would involve increasing law enforcement efficiency in combination with problem-solving approaches, urban planning and design, support for at-risk groups, and mobilization and participation of community members (UN-Habitat, 2003). This prompted UN-Habitat to set up the Safer Cities Programme in 1996 which aims to reinforce the capacities of local authorities to develop comprehensive crime prevention and urban safety strategies through leadership, partnerships and good governance. This forms an important part of efforts to achieve social and environmental sustainability of human settlements and reduce urban poverty.

The International Forum of Mayors for Safer Cities' Final Declaration and Plan of Action in 1998 emphasized the importance of strong collaboration between institutions, civil society, the private sector and citizens to reduce delinquency and violence (International Forum of Mayors for Safer Cities, 1998). Recognizing that safety has to be strategically planned and implemented, the Safer Cities strategy fosters the commitment of municipalities through establishing local partnerships and mobilizing

community members. A local coalition made up of institutional and community stakeholders (government, municipal and regional authorities and services, NGOs, police, education, health, the private sector and community leaders) diagnoses a city's safety situation and the community's resources, develops a crime prevention strategy and action plan adapted to local needs, implements the action plan, and evaluates its impacts. The action plan is subject to available resources, but must be guided by specific goals that target at-risk areas and populations. Some of the issues that have been targeted include more efficient and democratic law enforcement, social development, and increased civic participation. The ultimate goal is to integrate programs and partnerships into national policies in order to increase the capacities of municipalities and ensure the sustainability of the urban safety and crime prevention approach (UN-Habitat, 2003; 2005).

Various strategies are implemented through the Safer Cities approach. They include crime prevention through better environmental design and management of public spaces, institutional prevention, local and alternative forms of justice, and social prevention for groups at-risk, including women, children and youth and the elderly. There has been a particular interest in the safety of women through the integration of gender-based approaches and an increased understanding of gender-based violence. Safer Cities has improved data collection tools by legitimizing qualitative surveys and women's

safety audits and is developing and promoting partnerships with women's groups. Local strategies for youth at-risk, including youth organization networks, aim to empower youth (UN-Habitat, 2005).

Most of the cities involved in the Safer Cities initiative are in Africa. They include Johannesburg, Dar es Salaam, Abidjan, Durban, Yaounde, Douala, Bamako, Antananarivo and Nairobi. Some cities in Latin America and the South Pacific are also involved in the program. These initiatives have been supported by UN agencies such as the UNDP and by the international cooperation of various countries. The initiative in Dar es Salaam, for example, has been funded by the Governments of the Netherlands and Sweden and is aimed at strengthening the capacity of local governments to develop and sustain crime prevention initiatives through partnerships and a multi-faceted strategy (Mtani, 1998). The goals are to promote a culture of adherence to the law, reduce youth unemployment, and promote awareness of the city's role in crime prevention. Their strategy has included community-oriented policing, Neighbourhood Watch, ward tribunals, skills training for youth, women's safety audits, and a victimization survey (UN-Habitat, 2005a). In Abidjan, pilot projects were launched in three municipalities in 1998, funded by the UNDP. The programme has since been extended, with the support of UNDP and Belgium, to the other 10 municipalities forming the metropolitan region. A local safety and prevention committee has been set up in each municipality. A local safety diagnosis was undertaken and priorities for action were identified. More than 100 projects are now being implemented as part of municipal strategies and action plans. These initiatives include partnerships with the police, improvement to public infrastructures, training and recreational programs

for youth, income generating activities, support for victims, public participation and others.

A major output of the program has been the production of adapted methodological tools which include local safety diagnoses, victims' surveys, safety audits, and Scan surveys. Currently, Safer Cities, in collaboration with the South African Centre for Scientific Industrial Research's Crime Prevention Centre, is developing a comprehensive Safer Cities Urban Crime Prevention Toolkit. Using experiential knowledge of local governance processes, this toolkit will give practical guidelines to local governments and other stakeholders wanting to implement high quality, localized crime prevention initiatives. The six steps covered by the toolkit are:

- Start-up;
- Building the partnership;
- Understanding local safety;
- Developing the strategy;
- Action planning and implementation; and
- Institutionalizing the approach.

This process is to be supported by active management and leadership through information sharing, education and communication, and sustained through monitoring and evaluation of initiatives (UN-Habitat, n.d.). In addition to the toolkit, training modules will support local coordinators and local governments with their crime prevention strategies (UN-Habitat, 2005b).

The World Health Organization's Violence Prevention Strategy

Public health agencies around the world, from the World Health Organization (WHO) to national and

local public health agencies, are recognizing violence as a major public health priority. In 1996, the World Health Assembly requested the Director-General of the WHO to set up public health activities to respond to the problem of violence. In the 2002 *World Report on Violence and Health*, WHO asserts that violence is preventable and promotes a public health approach that is multi-disciplinary and evidence-based (Butchart et al., 2004; Krug et al., 2002). The report reviews the evidence that primary prevention efforts that target the root causes of interpersonal violence are both effective and cost-effective. The WHO makes nine recommendations for action to reduce violence (Krug et al., 2002):

1. Create, implement and monitor a national action plan for violence prevention;
2. Enhance the capacity for collecting data on violence;
3. Support research on the causes, consequences, costs and prevention of violence;
4. Promote primary prevention;
5. Strengthen responses for victims;
6. Integrate violence prevention into social and education policies, thereby promoting gender and social equality;
7. Increase collaboration and exchange of information on violence prevention;
8. Promote and monitor adherence to international treaties, laws and other mechanisms to protect human rights; and
9. Seek internationally agreed responses to the global drugs and arms trade.

The public health approach recognizes the need to address risk and protective factors for both victims and perpetrators of violence at the level of individuals, relationships, the community and society.

The Global Campaign for Violence Prevention was launched by WHO as the main platform for implementing the *World Report on Violence and Health* in 2002. The objectives of the campaign are to raise awareness about the problem of violence, highlight the role public health can play in addressing its causes and consequences, and encourage action at every level of society. As of 2007, over 50 countries had held national launches of the *World Report on Violence and Health*, and over 25 countries had developed reports and/or plans of action on violence and health. In addition, there are now officially appointed focal persons for the prevention of violence in health ministries in more than 100 countries (Brown, Butchart, Harvey, Bartolomeos, Meddings, & Sminkey, 2007).

The WHO is also secretariat to the Violence Prevention Alliance (VPA), a network of government, community based organizations, and private, international and intergovernmental agencies working to prevent violence. Members share a commitment to a public health approach to violence prevention that targets the root causes and risk factors underlying violence and improved support services for victims. VPA activities aim to develop policies, programs and tools to implement the recommendations of the *World Report on Violence and Health* in communities and countries around the world. VPA participants work together to: (1) increase capacity for information-gathering on the epidemiology of violence; (2) improve knowledge about what works in violence prevention policy and programming; and (3) encourage widespread implementation of policies and programs known to be effective.

In Canada, the Ontario and Canadian Public Health Associations have adopted resolutions on violence

prevention. A national initiative, *Prevention Violence Canada-Prevention de la violence Canada*, is currently being led by provincial public health associations with participation from federal and provincial/territorial governments, research institutes, academics, public health and other medical professionals, and community based organizations. This group is working together to develop a formal organizational structure and a national violence prevention strategy based on the WHO guidelines.

Two interesting applications of the public health approach to violence prevention are in Bogotá, the capital city of Colombia and in Glasgow, Scotland.

Bogotá, Colombia

Plagued by a staggering homicide rate in the early 1990s, the city of Bogotá, through collaboration with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO),¹² created an integrated prevention strategy based on the public health approach to target violence and human insecurity. Through a process of participatory community assessment, mechanisms were developed to prevent and reduce homicides through better control of firearms, measures that discouraged alcohol consumption and limited sale after certain hours, the promotion of urban planning, establishing family police stations to prevent family violence, improving public transportation, collaboration between police and local residents, and training police officers on treating the public with dignity and respect (Pan American Health Organization, 2005). A goal was to reclaim certain areas of the city identified as problems due to lack of security. *Mision Bogotá* has resulted in urban renewal of public spaces and inclusion, in development activities, of

sectors of the population that were not typically viewed as agents of development such as sex trade workers and homeless people. Since 1995, a fifty per cent reduction in homicides has been achieved (Pan American Health Organization, 2005). The success of *Mision Bogotá* can be attributed, at least in part, to a targeted approach that focused on problems in specific areas of the city, and that addressed public safety through a perspective that effectively promoted community participation.

Strathclyde Police Violence Reduction Unit

Scotland has a problem of violence related to a culture of knife-carrying. Glasgow has the highest murder rate in Europe and the rate of murders committed with knives is 3.5 times higher than in England and Wales. The long-term impacts of injury related to knife attacks include permanent physical and psychological scars that have serious impacts on employability and quality of life of young disadvantaged males. Together with the Scottish Executive, the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) of the Strathclyde Police has established a Violence Reduction Alliance. The objective of the Alliance is to prevent violence by working with the health, education and justice ministries and other agencies to achieve long-term societal and attitudinal change, and to address underlying causes such as economic and social inequalities, availability of weapons, alcohol misuse, family breakdown, and adversities in infancy and childhood (Brown et al., 2007).

A combination of traditional and innovative enforcement techniques are used to tackle knife violence, including fingerprinting knife-carrying

12 PAHO serves as the Regional Office for the Americas of the World Health Organization.

offenders, taking DNA, refusing bail for second-time offenders, and implementation of a new Offensive Weapons Court which ensures consistency in sentencing. Police are partnering with local hospitals to develop an injury surveillance system which will assist in targeting high-risk areas and developing interventions for injury prevention.

The following interventions have been implemented by the Violence Reduction Unit in 2006/2007.

- *Primary prevention*: support for parents through pre- and peri-natal service, pre-school enrichment programs, anti-violence leaflets for parents of every school age child, public awareness campaigns aimed at changing cultural norms around the culture of knife-carrying and violence.
- *Secondary prevention*: violence prevention programs, school programs on anger management, conflict resolution and restorative practices, lesson plans for teachers focusing on knife-carrying, reducing alcohol availability for youth under 18.
- *Tertiary prevention*: alcohol/violence prevention briefing to men in hospital to motivate behavioural change, gang intervention and prevention programs, parenting programs and violence reduction programs in correctional institutions.

In 2006, the VRU spearheaded the Safer Scotland initiative that included a blitz on outstanding warrants, a knife amnesty, targeted enforcement, and educational campaigns on knife violence. One such campaign is “Action on Violence in Scotland” which seeks to promote awareness of the devastating effects of knife violence through victims’ stories, with information on violence reduction for practitioners.

Conclusion

Strengthening the capacity of local governments to develop and sustain crime prevention initiatives through partnerships and multi-faceted strategies are not just a goal of highly developed countries. In African cities, the Safer Cities Programme of UN-Habitat assists local authorities to develop comprehensive crime prevention and urban safety strategies as an important aspect of achieving sustainability of human settlements. Common principles identified throughout this document—strong collaboration between different sectors of governments, non-government organizations, the private sector and citizens—apply equally in low and middle income countries. The Safer Cities approach emphasizes diagnosis, developing an integrated strategy and action plan, implementation and evaluation. Sustainability and capacity building around urban safety and crime prevention strategies are recognized as key to success; this is to be achieved by embedding programs and partnerships into national policies.

A growing number of rich and poor countries are developing public health approaches to preventing inter-personal violence, many benefiting from the leadership and support of the World Health Organization. The public health approach is based on a commitment to target the protective and risk factors that underlay violence and improve the knowledge base about what works through monitoring and evaluation. Cities such as Bogotá illustrate the potential of these approaches where public policy was informed by epidemiological analysis of health data so that rates of murder were reduced by fifty per cent. It requires a commitment to data development and analysis, understanding

the risk and protective factors of violence, tackling causes through prevention rather than waiting for law enforcement to react, promoting gender and social equality, strengthening services for victims,

and developing a national action plan. The WHO emphasizes the need to use short term and long term goals and to maintain the initiative beyond initial success.

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VII. WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

Multi-agency approaches to preventing crime and improving community safety are expanding around the world. There are many lessons for Canada based on the experiences of other countries. This review provides evidence that reductions in crime and improvements in community safety can be achieved through comprehensive strategies involving multi-agency partnerships at the local level. A greater use of evidence-based crime prevention is needed to have a sustained and sustainable impact on crime at the local level. But, one thing is for certain: “Simply knowing what to do does not automatically translate into doing what is best” (Homel et al., 2004, p. xi).

This review highlights certain key elements that must be present to ensure success and sustainability, including governance structures that are able to sustain these efforts during political and environmental change. This means:

- Establishing a locus of responsibility with strong political leadership;
- Establishing multi-agency and multi-disciplinary partnerships in order to harness the combined expertise of different government departments, non-governmental organizations, the corporate sector and local citizens;
- Mobilizing local political and administrative authorities; and
- Emphasizing the need for greater integration of safety as a cross-cutting element of municipal planning.

Once an effective governance structure has been established, certain activities are essential for successfully targeting the risk factors and root causes behind local crime and safety problems and having a long-term impact:

- Establishing a problem-solving model;
- Developing an accurate understanding of the nature and dimensions of local problems through data analysis and research, including developing the capacity to do this;
- Incorporating the knowledge of frontline police, practitioners and academic researchers;
- Building on collaborative efforts and programs already established at the local level, fostering community involvement and a sense of ownership;
- Implementing a range of programs based on knowledge of what works;
- Ensuring that these strategies do not have negative impacts elsewhere;
- Setting targets and monitoring performance through reliable data such as victimization surveys; and
- Having access to funding and technical resources to achieve short and long term impacts in a sustainable way.

Examples are provided in this document where these principles have been implemented with good results. Evaluations in Birmingham, Boston and Bogotá demonstrate impressive results when the problem-

solving approach and multi-agency partnerships are employed to target local problems (Waller, 2006). In the United Kingdom, where multi-sector partnerships at the municipal level are mandated through legislation and there is a strong focus on capacity building and outcomes, victimization has been reduced. There is good evidence from several cities in the United States that when police adopt a problem-solving model and work in collaboration with social agencies and citizens, crime and violence in communities can be effectively reduced.

The tasks of implementing and sustaining comprehensive initiatives are not without certain challenges, however. For example, while working in partnership is key to success, not every community will have equal capacity to deliver on multi-agency partnerships. In reality, very disadvantaged communities where interventions are needed most may have difficulty developing and sustaining partnerships, conducting audits of the local area, identifying programs that show promise of reducing crime, and conducting evaluations. Problems with building capacity and sustaining efforts once they are underway can interfere with the ability of communities to maintain structures needed for long-term change.

Working in partnership provides organizations with governance and accountability challenges even when communities have good capacity and people get together with the best intentions to collaborate on shared problems (Audit Commission, 2005). Agencies involved in the partnership may focus on their own interests and biases, and their own agency and personal perspectives, and may be unwilling to consider an approach that is not consistent with their current program of work. They may be

strongly committed to programs they are familiar with, whether or not they have been proven to be effective in reducing crime. Community agencies and groups often will not have the flexibility to take on additional responsibilities. Related to this is the fact that cooperation with crime reduction projects may not be readily obtained from agencies for whom crime is not a central focus of their activities (Nutley & Homel, 2006, p. 23).

Tensions among participating organizations may arise because of different management cultures, failure to use the skills and experience of partner organizations effectively and to develop them to best effect, poor communication and information sharing, and uneven levels of support from partners. A lack of partnership-specific performance measures can result in individual agencies reverting back to “silos” (Maguire, 2004, p. 232). Crime prevention partnerships can undermine their greatest strength when they fail to be inclusive, for example by excluding important community groups or including only government or law enforcement agencies (Rosenbaum, 2002).

Finally, planners of crime prevention strategies must take account of the difficulties of adapting successful efforts in one context to another where systems of government differ significantly. Federated states, such as Canada, the United States and Australia vest authority for certain services at the state or provincial level and others at the municipal level which presents challenges to those wishing to adapt promising models from the United Kingdom or France where national and local governments work more directly together. A made-in-Canada model is required for the future which adapts the best of what has been learned from other countries to the unique

political and cultural settings in this country. The forthcoming IPC publication *Making Cities Safer: Canadian Strategies and Practices* will describe crime prevention strategies and governance structures in major municipalities, their successes and challenges, and make recommendations for the future.

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